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INTRODUCION
The health care industry has changed fundamentally since courts first
gave physicians the power to set their own legal standard of care. Industry
power has shifted away from physicians and toward managed care
organizations. In an effort to keep costs down, these managed care
organizations use a variety of strategies to influence the clinical practices of
participating physicians. Under these circumstances, tort law's deference to
medical customs is a quaint relic of a simpler time.
Although it is not widely appreciated, many states are abandoning their
deference to medical customs and are empowering juries, with the help of
experts, to decide what a reasonable physician would have done under the
circumstances.1 However, abandonment of the custom-based standard of
care fundamentally alters the role of the jury. In states that have made this
shift, the jury, not the medical profession, sets the standard of care.
Although evidence of customary practices is still admissible, it no longer
binds the jury.
The prospect of a widespread retreat from the custom-based standard of
care has obvious policy implications. On the one hand, abandonment of the
custom-based standard will enable judges and juries to police the practices
of physicians facing intense pressure to cut costs. On the other hand, it may
demand more of layjurors than we can reasonably expect of them. And if, as
some suspect, juries are unwilling to allow physicians and managed care
organizations to be cost-conscious, then jury standard-setting could threaten
efforts to keep health care affordable.
The choice between these two rival standards is made more difficult by
the fact that each has serious shortcomings. Juries may misuse statistical
proof evidence, may be susceptible to hindsight bias, and may penalize
responsible efforts to keep health care costs under control. Sadly, the
evidence regarding medical customs is no less disappointing. Research on
physician behavior has revealed that physicians, like the rest of us, are
vulnerable to self-interest, habit, and other competing influences. Customs
vary inexplicably from one location to another. In addition, market
imperfections so permeate health care delivery that competition cannot be
trusted to discipline medical customs.
Under these circumstances, neither choice is especially appealing.
Despite the imperfections associated with jury decision-making, however,
1. See infra Part I (discussing the decline of deference to medical customs). Over the past
several decades, nearly half of the states have quietly abandoned the custom-based standard of
care. This migration away from the custom-based standard of care is described at much greater
length in Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 166-68 (2000). Part I of this Article draws heavily from
that prior work.
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there are important justifications for assigning juries, rather than physicians,
the power to set the medical standard of care. Juries are more likely than
either physicians or insurance executives to strike a balance between cost
and quality that reflects community values. Furthermore, the recent
transformation of the health care industry has transferred considerable
power from physicians to the health insurance industry, an industry that has
not yet earned the privilege of self-regulation. Finally, the reasonable
physician standard gives the health care industry an incentive to engage the
community in a dialogue about health care resources. If the industry desires
to lower the standard of care below levels that juries are demanding, the
industry will need either to convince the public (i.e., future jurors) that
frugality is socially responsible or to obtain the agreement of subscribers ex
ante to a modification of the standard of care. By contrast, the custom-based
standard allows health care professionals to decide unilaterally what is good
for the community. For these reasons, it is worth taking the risk that juries
will look skeptically at cost control measures.
This Article is organized in five Parts. Part I introduces the conventional
understanding of medical malpractice doctrine and summarizes the
evidence that state courts are retreating from a custom-based standard of
care. Part II examines the fear that juries will reach unfair verdicts if left to
determine the standard of care themselves. Part III evaluates the argument
that medical customs constitute a more reliable barometer of reasonable
care. Part IV then explores the advantages of assigning juries the power to
set the standard of care using a reasonable physician standard. Finally, Part
V synthesizes the arguments and concludes that courts should adopt the
reasonable physician standard of care.
I. DEFERENCE AND ITS DECLINE
For more than a century, courts have given physicians the power to set
their own standard of care. This delegation of standard-setting authority to
private parties dramatically distinguishes malpractice actions from other
negligence litigation. In recent years, however, many state courts have been
rethinking their deference to medical customs and have been returning to
juries the power to set the standard of care.
A. TRADITIONAL DEERENCE TO MEDICAL CUSTOMS
In most negligence actions, the defendant's compliance with industry
customs is simply one factor for the jury to consider.2 While evidence of
applicable customs is admissible, the jury is free to demand more
2. Ordinary tort defendants are expected to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 295A (1965) (stating that custom is a
factor but not controlling in the determination of whether an actor is negligent); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 33, at 193-96 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining the
bearing of custom upon the standard of reasonable care).
[2002]
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precautions than industry norms require. As Learned Hand said in The T.J.
Hooper, "[an industry] never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.
Since the late nineteenth century, however, courts have treated
physicians quite differently. Medical customs are not merely admissible, they
define the physician's legal standard of care In the words of Dean Prosser,
the custom-based standard of care "gives the medical profession . . . the
privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of setting
their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own
practices.
By deferring conclusively to medical customs, courts materially changed
the jury's function in malpractice actions. In an ordinary negligence action,
the jury must consider all of the evidence adduced and then determine
whether the defendant behaved reasonably under the circumstances. To do
so, the jury must make important judgments about the value of life and
personal safety and about the proper level of safety precautions. In a
malpractice action, at least in theory, the jury does not make these value
judgments-the medical profession does. The jury's job is merely to
determine whether the defendant has complied with the industry norms.
B. THERECENTRETREATFROMA CUSTOM-BASED STANDARD
Gradually, quietly, and relentlessly, state courts are abandoning the
custom-based standard of care. Thus far, eleven states and the District of
Columbia have expressly refused to equate reasonable care with customary
3. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
4. See, e.g., Osborn v. Invin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 125 (Cal. C. App.
1992) (describing custom as the majority rule); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PuBLIC POLICY 16, 139-40 (1985) (stating that deviations from reliance
on custom standard are "rare"); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL, HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 238 (1995)
(same); DAVID M. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 89 (1973) (stating that custom defines the
standard of care); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 32, at 189 (same); SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN
POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT. THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 7, 101 (1978) (same); CLARENCE
MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRISJR., MORRIS ON TORTS 55 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that custom is the
rule in medical malpractice);James A. Henderson, Jr. &John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care
and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382,
1384 (1994) (same); Alan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 560, 605-06 (1959) (same); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
1147, 1147, 1158 (1942) (stating custom normally should define standard of care); Theodore
Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 1193, 1212 (stating custom determines standard of care). Similarly, the Second
Restatement of Torts states that the physician must "exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed" by other physicians. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 299A (1965) (emphasis
added).
5. KEETON ErAL., supra note 2, § 32, at 89.
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practices.6 The most famous of these cases is Helling v. Carey,7 a Washington
Supreme Court decision. However, custom has also been abandoned in
Colorado, s the District of Columbia,9 Florida,'
° Illinois," Louisiana, 12
Minnesota, 13 Mississippi, 14 Nevada, 5 Texas,1
6 Wisconsin,17 and Wyoming.1
These states now use a "reasonable physician" test.
Another nine states, although not explicitly addressing the role of
custom, have also endorsed the "reasonable physician" test. These states are
Indiana, 19 Kentucky,2 0 Maryland, 21 Montana (for non-board certified general
6. In addition to these jurisdictions, four additional states have appellate decisions
expressly rejecting customary standards: Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, and Oklahoma.
However, the current law in these states is unclear. See Peters, supra note 1, at 175-79 (discussing
the cases in these states at length).
7. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
8. See State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194 (Colo. 1994) (citing
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992)) (finding that presumption
that adherence to customary practices provides a reasonable standard of care is rebuttable with
proof to the contrary).
9. See Ray v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 404 (D.C. 1996) (upholding reasonably
prudent professional standard); see also Cleary v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 691 A.2d 148, 156
(D.C. 1997) (stating that the duty owed is that of a "reasonably prudent physician").
10. See Doctors Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Evans, 543 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Nesbitt v. Comm. Health, 467 So. 2d 711, 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)) (disregarding
the customary methods test and emphasizing the prudent person standard).
11. See Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027-28 (Ill. 1996) (stating, in
an action against a blood bank, that custom was not conclusive even for medical professionals
and favoring citing Chiero and Lundahl on this point); Chiero v. Chi. Osteopathic Hosp., 392
N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) ("[G]eneral custom is . .. not, however, conclusive.");
Lundahl v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("It is entirely
possible, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital . . . that what is the usual or customary procedure might itself be
negligence.").
12. See Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. Ct. App. 1962). The law
in Louisiana is complex and is reviewed in more detail in Peters, supra note 1, at 173 n.55.
13. See KaIsbeck v. Westview Clinic, PA., 375 N.W.2d 861, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding a reasonable care standard). But see Ogle v. Bassett Creek Dental, PA, No. C6-96-
2060, 1997 WL 292163, at *2 (Minn. June 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (assuming that a
medical standard of care is customary).
14. See McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 381 (Miss. 1994) (stating that a physician
must be minimally competent and act in a reasonably prudent manner); Hall v. Hilburn, 466
So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985) (same).
15. See Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391,396 n.5 (Nev. 1993) (agreeing with the
Colorado Supreme Court that customary practices may be deficient).
16. See Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977) (applying a reasonably prudent
doctor standard).
17. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996) (stating that the standard
of care applicable to physicians is what is reasonable given the state of medical knowledge at
time of treatment).
18. See Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981) (articulating the standard as
"that which is required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances").
19. See Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ind. 1992) (requiring a physician to
[2002]
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practitioners) ,22 Oregon,23 Vermont,24 Virginia,25 West Virginia,2r and, less
27
clearly, New Hampshire. In these states, like the states that have expressly
rejected deference to custom, the jury decides whether the physician
.exercise that degree of care, skill, proficiency exercised by reasonably careful, skillful, and
prudent practicioners in the same class to which he belongs, acting under the same or similar
circumstances"); see also Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. 1992) (holding that a
plaintiff's expert must establish what reasonable doctors similarly situated would have done).
20. See Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970) (requiring the "degree of skill which
is expected of a reasonably competent practicioner'). Some ambiguity arguably remains
because Blair, in 1970, said that "we will leave determination of the standard to the medical
profession and not the lay courts." Blair, 461 S.W.2d at 373. The more recent cases, however,
use a reasonability test. When I practiced in Kentucky, it was commonplace to ask experts
whether the defendants had violated "the standard of care" without further defining the
standard.
21. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 255 (Md. 1975)
(holding that "a hospital is required to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a
reasonably competent hospital in the same or similar circumstances").
22. See Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 210 (Mont. 1990) (requiring "the standard of care
of a 'reasonably competent general practitioner acting in the same or similar community ... in
the same or similar circumstances'").
23. See OR. REv. STAT. § 677.095 (1999) (defining degree of care as "that degree of care,
skill and diligence that is used by ordinarily careful physicians . . . in the same or similar
circumstances in the community.., or a similar community"); Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp.,
772 P.2d 929, 933 (Or. 1989) ("[A] physician must always exercise reasonable care.").
24. See Rooney v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 649 A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994) (holding doctors to the
standard of what a reasonable doctor would have done under similar circumstances); accord
Short v. United States, 908 F. Supp. 227, 236 (D. Vt. 1995) (applying the Rooney standard).
25. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Michie 2000) ("[T]he standard of care by which the
acts or omissions are to be judged shall be that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a
reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice or speciality in this Commonwealth.");
Raines v. Lutz, 341 S.E.2d 194, 196 (Va. 1986) ("Health care providers are required by law to
possess and exercise only that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent
practitioner in the same field of practice or specialty in Virginia."); accord Bryan v. Burt, 486
S.E.2d 536 (Va. 1997) (stating that a physician must demonstrate the degree of skill and
diligence employed by a reasonably prudent practitioner).
26. See W. VA. CODE ANN § 55-7B-3 (2000) (requiring proof that the "care provider failed
to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning required or expected of a reasonable,
prudent health care provider ... in the same or similar circumstances"). But see Tennant v.
Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374,393 (W. Va. 1995) (finding that an erroneous
instruction applying a standard of care of the "average doctor" engaged in the field was not
prejudicial); Howe v. Thompson, 412 S.E.2d 212, 215-17 (W. Va. 1991) (allowing a jury
instruction of a standard of care containing elements of both reasonability and custom). In
1994, a federal court concluded that West Virginia would reject a custom-based standard of
care. Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1233-34 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
27. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1997) (considering whether a practitioner has
.acted with due care having in mind the standards and recommended practices and procedures
of his profession, and the training, experience and professed degree of skill of the average
practitioner of such profession, and all other relevant circumstances"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-C:2 (1997) (explaining plaintiff has burden of proving "standard of acceptable professional
practice in the medical care provider's profession or specialty"); Morrill v. Tilney, 519 A.2d 293,
296-97 (N.H. 1986) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1997), establishing the standard of
medical malpractice).
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behaved reasonably, not whether she complied with custom. 28 Although
experts still battle in the courtroom, they argue about what physicians should
do, not what physicians ordinarily do.
In addition to the states that have moved to a reasonability standard,
several other states have case law that is too ambiguous, inconsistent, or
conflicting to classify confidently.29 As a consequence, the fraction of states
that unambiguously endorse the custom-based standard of care has fallen
from a clear majority to a shrinking plurality.
Finally, courts in states that purportedly endorse the custom-based
standard often allow plaintiffs more latitude than this standard of care would
imply.3 0 Plaintiffs in these states commonly reach a jury even when their
experts have stated only that the defendant's conduct is not "acceptable,"
not "appropriate," or fails to meet the "standard of care."31 The experts in
these cases have not been required to testify that the defendant deviated
from customary practice. Nor is the admission of respected clinical practice
guidelines premised on proof that they describe actual rather than
recommended practice. 2
In theory, of course, the "respectable minority" rule should protect
physician defendants from liability in cases where physicians simply
disagree. 3 However, as Mark Hall correctly points out, courts typically give
28. See supra text accompanying note 4 (discussing the case law).
29. These states are Arizona, California, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
SeePeters, supra note 1, at 175-79, 181-82, 190 (discussing the cases from thesejurisdictions).
30. See id. at 185 (discussing the cases).
31. See Sanders v. Ramo, 416 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that experts'
affidavits may give the opinion of the failure to exercise due care without reciting the proper
legal standard of care); Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198, 206 (1953) (finding expert's testimony of
hypothetical patient's medical reaction sufficient to establish a standard of care); McGrady v.
Wright, 729 P.2d 338, 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that plaintiff's expert created a
prima facie case by testifying that a reasonable and prudent doctor would have taken a biopsy);
Heirs v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Mo. 1992) (accepting testimony about defendant's
failure to "exercise that degree of skill and learning that an ordinarily careful and prudent
physician would have exercised"); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 605 (S.C. 1995)
(affirming judgment based on expert's testimony that defendant had deviated from "the
standard of care"). Some courts are more strict; see, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 86-88
(Me. 1974) (rejecting testimony that defendant's conduct was "bad practice"); Kortus v.Jensen,
237 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Neb. 1976) (rejecting testimony that plaintiff's expert would have acted
differently).
32. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 663-65, 677-84 (2001) (arguing that clinical
practice guidelines do not indicate customary uses).
33. The "respectable minority" or "two schools of thought" rule permits physicians to
choose among respectable schools of medical thought without fear of liability. See, e.g., Downer,
322 A.2d at 87 ("[A] physician does not incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of
several recognized courses of treatment."); Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967)
(stating there can be "difference of opinion among competent physicians"); FURROW ET AL,
supra note 4 at 382-84 (describing the "respectable minority" defense). This rule arises out of
judicial unwillingness to choose among conflicting schools of thought when physicians
[2002]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 916 2001-2002
MODERNT MALPRACTICE LAW
these cases to the jury.34 The jury then applies a de facto reasonability test in
order to determine whether the defendant's school of thought was
"respectable." As a consequence, contemporary support for the custom-
based standard of care is far weaker than previously supposed.
35
C. JUDICIAL RATONALES FOR THE SHIFT
Courts abandoning the custom-based standard of care have shared
Judge Hand's view that "[c]ourts in the end must say what is required."36
"Negligence," said the Wyoming Supreme Court, "cannot be excused on the
grounds that others practice the same kind of negligence."37 Otherwise, said
the Colorado Supreme Court, "the profession itself would be permitted to
set the measure of its own legal liability, even though that measure might be
far below a level of care readily attainable."ss The unstated conclusion in
these opinions is that deference to customary standards would place the
profession above the law.39
The courts have not, however, explained why the once-persuasive
arguments made in favor of a custom-based standard are no longer
• • 40
convincing. Perhaps courts were influenced by the consumerism of the
themselves cannot reach a consensus. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. f
(1965) ("The law cannot undertake to decide technical questions of proper practice over which
experts reasonably disagree .... ."). As a result, physicians are theoretically insulated from
liability both when they comply with an established custom and when respectable medical
opinion is divided on which medical practice is best.
34. See Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 119, 128-29 (noting the failure of the "respectable
minority" rule to keep these cases from the jury); see also Peters, supra note 1, at 186 (same).
35. Moreover, the movement away from the custom-based standard has not run out of
momentum. In the 1980s, four states expressly rejected customs and three adopted a
reasonable-physician standard. In the 1990s, four more jurisdictions rejected conclusive
reliance on a custom-based standard and Indiana adopted a reasonable-physician standard. If
this trend continues, the states that assign standard-setting to the jury will soon constitute a
majority. However, it is also possible that some of the states that have adopted the reasonable-
physician test without explicitly addressing the role of custom will ultimately end up deferring
to customs. SeePeters, supra note 1, at 184 (discussing the facts that support this possibility).
36. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); see,
e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Sers., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027 (I1. 1996) (noting that custom is
not conclusive of proper care (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,
257 (Ill. 1965) (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denki, 287 U.S.
662 (1932)))); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996) (noting that customary
conduct is not dispositive of reasonable care).
37. Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981).
38. United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509,520 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
39. See, e.g., id. (noting that courts, not professions, decide due care (quoting The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740)); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d at 257 (same).
40. Interestingly, however, the timing and text of the opinions abandoning the custom-
based standard of care suggest that the trend was not, at least initially, triggered by a reaction
against the growth of managed care delivery systems. The trend began in the 1970s, well before
managed care companies had gained a significant market share or become the target of public
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1970s.41 Or perhaps they may have lost their faith that physicians are
sufficiently different from engineers, truck drivers, product manufacturers,
and other tort defendants to justify the legal privileges previously accorded
to them.42
Whatever the explanation, it is clear today that courts defer less to
physicians than they once did and are less willing to erect special rules for
health care providers. For example, physicians are no longer exempt from
antitrust laws.43 In many states, physicians no longer enjoy the protection
from corporate competition once provided by the corporate practice
prohibitions. 44 In tort law, physicians have lost the protection of the strict
locality rule 45 and are also required to obtain informed consent.46 In
addition, courts appear to be retreating from some of the special "no duty"
rules that once typified medical malpractice law, such as the rule that
pharmacists have no duty to warn patients about incompatible prescriptions
and the rule that "on call" doctors have no duty to emergency patients until
they establish a physician-patient relationship.47 Abandonment of the
custom-based standard of care is consistent with this trend away from special
rules for health care providers.
The weakening of support for the custom-based standard of care is also
consistent with the gradual movement of twentieth-century tort law away
from special duties tailored for specific social contexts and toward a general
obligation of reasonable care. Throughout the twentieth century, early tort
law's complex matrix of immunities and special duty rules has been giving
way to a more simple regime in which more people are exposed to tort
liability and their duty is simply to behave reasonably.48 For example, many
controversy. Furthermore, the more recent opinions make no reference to the emergence of
managed care systems or the need for greater judicial scrutiny of an increasingly
commercialized health care delivery system.
41. SeeWILLIAMCURRANETAL.,HEALTHCARELAWANDETHICS 213 (5th ed. 1998) (noting
that consumerism eroded the "authority and supremacy" of the physician and may have made
possible the rise of the informed consent cause of action).
42. See Peters, supra note 1, at 196-99 (discussing the evidence that public trust is
declining).
43. MARK A. HALL& IRA MARK ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS INA NUTSHELL 186
(1990).
44. See People v. Pac. Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938) (stating that corporations
may not engage in the practice of medicine); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 198-234 (1982) (describing the struggle of physicians to avoid corporate
dominance).
45. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbur, 466 So. 2d 865, 871 (Miss. 1985) (requiring doctors to follow
national standards of care, not local ones); FURROW ETAL, supra note 4, at 239-40.
46. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. CL App.
1957); FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 265-87.
47. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Breaking Down the Boundaries of Malpractice Law, 65 Mo. L. REv.
1047, 1047 (2000).
48. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L.
REV. 963, 963-77 (1981) (discussing the growth of negligence principles and the abrogation of
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states have simplified the obligations of possessors of land, replacing the
tripartite status-based duty rules with a single duty of reasonable care.
49
Similarly, many states have expanded recovery for emotional distress0 and
for failure to warn.51 In addition, the charitable, family, and governmental
immunities have all been partially or completely abrogated.52 Overall, these
changes suggest that tort law is evolving to-ward a general duty of reasonable
care. Malpractice law's movement away from a custom-based standard of
care is consistent ith this trend.
D. IMPLICATIONS
Whether dejure or de facto, the shift away from the customary standard
and toward a reasonable physician standard takes the task of standard-setting
away from the profession and assigns it to the jury.53 The centrality of this
special classifications and immunities).
49. See, eg., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566-69 (Cal. 1968) (discarding the
common-law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee in favor of a simple, unified
negligence standard).
50. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (allowing emotional distress
recovery to a mother who witnessed her child's death, but was in no danger herself); Bass v.
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768-73 (Mo. 1983) (abandoning the impact rule in emotional
distress cases).
51. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-48 (Cal. 1976) (finding
that a psychiatrist has duty to warn potential victims of dangerous patients when a "special
relationship" exists between the doctor and either the patient or victim); Madden v. C & K
Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Mo. 1988) (finding that a business owner has a
duty to protect invitees from foreseeable torts of third parties).
52. See KEErON ETAL, supra note 2, § 131-35, at 1032-73 (surveying immunities).
53. The switch to a reasonable physician standard also has at least three practical
consequences. First, judges will permit plaintiffs to reach a jury without proving that the
defendant failed to do what most physicians do. Page Keeton, Medical Negligence-The Standard of
Care, 10 TEX. TECH L. REv. 351, 363 (1979). Second,juries will hear instructions describing the
standard of care in terms of reasonability rather than compliance with custom. In Indiana, for
example, the courts have approved jury instructions using a reasonable-physician standard. See
Miller v. Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 248 nA (Ind. Ct App. 1999) (approving a trial court instruction
using the reasonable physician test). In Vermont, too, the state supreme court has endorsed the
use of the reasonable physician standard injury instructions. See Rooney v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. 649
A.2d 756, 760 (Vt 1994) (disapproving of "error in judgment" language, but approving
reasonable care language in a challenged jury instruction). Oregon's supreme court has not
directly faced the issue, but its discussion of improper jury instructions in a 1989 case strongly
suggests that the jury is to be given the issue of reasonable care. See Rogers v. Meridian Park
Hosp. 772 P.2d 929, 933 (Or. 1989) (overturning a verdict for a defendant anesthesiologist
because the jury instruction wrongly suggested that a physician's duty to "exercise reasonable
judgment" depended on existence of "reasonable differences of opinion"). Third, courts will
expect the parties to explain why the defendant's actions were (or were not) reasonable,just as
they do in all other negligence litigation. That means that evidence of the costs and benefits of
any untaken precautions will now be admissible.
These changes are occurring not only in states that have expressly rejected deference
to custom, but also in states that have quietly adopted a reasonable physician test. In Indiana,
for example, the plaintiff's expert must state "what other reasonable doctors similarly situated
would have done under the circumstances." Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. 1992).
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doctrinal shift cannot be overstated. The delegation of standard-setting
authority to the professions is unique in tort law. It is the foundation upon
which the field of medical malpractice law has been built.
54
Under the custom-based standard of care, the relevant inquiry is not
whether the defendant behaved like a reasonable person or even whether
she behaved as a reasonable physician. Instead, the jury must determine
whether the defendant conformed with customary practices. Consequently,
the jury's inquiry is positive, rather than normative.55 The jury determines
what the customary practice is, it does not decide what the custom ought to
be.56 The law assigns the normative judgment to the medical profession.
Because the question for the jury is what physicians do not why they do
it, evidence of the ineffectiveness of customary practices often is excluded
from evidence at trial. 57 Under the custom-based standard of care, that
evidence is irrelevant. As one court explained, "professional prudence is
defined by actual or accepted practice within a profession, rather than
theories about what 'should' have been done."5 8 By the same logic, evidence
of authoritative clinical practice guidelines also ought to be excluded
(although typically it is not).59
Under the jury-applied reasonable physician standard, by contrast, the
jury, not the profession, determines what a reasonable physician would have
done under similar circumstances. Medical customs, to the extent that they
Michigan law appears to operate in a similar fashion. See Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786,
791 (Mich. 1994) (stating that expert must explain "what a reasonably prudent surgeon would
do, in keeping with the standards of professional practice"). Furthermore, in West Virginia, a
federal district court, applying the professional standard of care, refused to grant a summary
judgment against a plaintiff whose experts challenged the customary practices of the blood-
banking industry as dilatory. Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D. W. Va.
1994). The West Virginia law on jury instructions is less clear. See Tennant v. Marion Health
Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 393 (W. Va. 1995) (finding that jury instruction with
erroneous language on standard of care was not prejudicial). In addition, anecdotal evidence
from Kentucky and New Hampshire suggests that their courts do not require a plaintiffs expert
to prove that the defendant failed to do what most physicians do. In Kentucky, where I
practiced for several years, plaintiffs' experts commonly testified only that the defendant's
conduct had not met the "standard of care." Lawyers in New Hampshire report a similar
experience.
54. See Peters, supra note 1, at 166-68 (describing the array of subsidiary doctrines
accompanying the custom-based standard of care).
55. See James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutiona Lega4 and Policy
Analysis, 59 TFX. L. REv. 1345, 1396 (1981) (noting that the custom-based standard requires no
normative judgment).
56. See id. (noting that the custom-based standard requires no normative judgment).
57. See, Schneider, 817 F.2d at 990 (stating that evidence of effectiveness of treatment is
irrelevant); cf FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 238-39 (noting that defendants normally do not
offer evidence of effectiveness of customary practices).
58. Osboru v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
59. See Mello, supra note 32, at 663-65, 677-84 (arguing that clinical practice guidelines are
typically inaccurate evidence of customary practice and discussing the admissibility of clinical
practice guidelines as evidence of the standard of care).
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exist, are admissible but not binding on the jury. Several important policy
consequences flow from this transfer of authority. Most obviously, the
abandonment of a custom-based standard of care will make adherence to
outmoded customs more dangerous and innovation less risky. More
importantly, the change in standards will empower the jury to set a floor
below which cost containment practices cannot descend absent an
enforceable agreement to modify the standard of care. 6° The crucial
unanswered question is whetherjurors can handle that task responsibly.
II. JURY COMPETENCE
Over the past century, the justification most frequently offered for
taking the power of standard-setting away from the jury is that lay people
cannot be trusted to determine what reasonable medical care requires. The
fabric of this argument has five related threads. The first and most obvious
concern is that lay jurors lack the training needed to evaluate complex
medical treatment decisions. The second thread is a fear that juries will be
sympathetic to injured plaintiffs and biased against wealthy defendants. A
third and more recent concern is that juries will not permit defendants to
take costs into account, even though the balancing of costs against benefits
is an integral part of modern negligence law. The fourth concern is that jury
verdicts will be distorted by two cognitive biases that apply to hindsight
judgments: hindsight bias and outcome bias. The final concern is that
malpractice disputes, especially those involving resource allocation, are
"polycentric" and, therefore, not capable of resolution without adopting
some concrete benchmark, such as compliance with medical customs.
Each of these concerns identifies an important potential limit on the
jury's ability to apply a reasonable care standard fairly. Happily, the
empirical research on jury behavior is more favorable than this list of
concerns would suggest.
A. JURY CAPACITY
Many proponents of a custom-based standard of care doubt that lay
jurors have the technical expertise or intellectual ability to evaluate the
conduct of skilled professionals. 6 1 Critics fear that juries will be confused by
60. In theory, cost conscious providers will also be freer to deviate from wasteful standards
set by fee-for-service medicine. In practice, however, it is far from clear that juries will be
receptive to cost-based explanations. See infra Part II.0 (discussing jury willingness to consider
costs).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (noting a
preference toward a professionally generated standard of care); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at
189 (discussing "the layman's ignorance of medical matters"); Richard E. Leahy, RationalHealth
Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call forJudicial Deference to Medical Malpractice Guidelines 77
CAL L. REV. 1483, 1496-98 (1989) (expressing doubt over jurors' ability to comprehend
complex expert witness testimony on the medical standard of care); Morris, supra note 4, at
1164 (suggesting that neitherjudges norjuries are able to reasonably assess medical evidence).
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scientific evidence and, in their confusion, will be vulnerable to
manipulation by plaintiffs' attorneys and their hired-gun experts, who will
elicit sympathy for injured plaintiffs2 and antipathy toward wealthy
defendants. 63 In his much-cited article on the malpractice standard of care,
Allan McCoid concluded that juries were not technically competent to
understand the issues in a malpractice case.64 Clarence Morris, in his classic
1942 article Custom and Negligence, theorized that neither the judge nor the
jury is "competent to judge whether or not a doctor has acted reasonably."65
Joseph King opined that medical error should not be "evaluated by the ad
hoc judgment of a lay judge or lay jurors aided by hindsight ... ."66 These
critics doubt the ability of the jury to assess the credibility of the conflicting
experts accurately.67
Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies that test these fears
directly. No research has compared the outcomes reached under a custom-
based standard with those obtained under a reasonable physician standard.
Nevertheless, the existing body of empirical research on jury decision-
making does provide a useful background against which to form educated
hypotheses about the jury's capacity to reach fair verdicts while applying a
reasonable care standard.
1. Evidence ofJudge-Jury Concordance
One method commonly used by social scientists to evaluate jury
performance is to compare the outcomes reached by juries with those
reached by judges. Researchers have repeatedly found that juries and judges
reach extremely similar conclusions about tort liability. As a consequence,
these studies do not provide support for the contention that juries are
especially sympathetic to plaintiffs and vulnerable to manipulation by
plaintiffs' attorneys.
That finding has been confirmed using two very different
62. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITCS OF
REFORM 127-28 (1995) (discussing fears about pro-plaintiff bias);Joseph H. King,Jr., In Search of
a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213,
1254 (1975) (noting the pro-plaintiff bias of lay juries); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND THE AMERCANJURY 4 (1995) (quoting the North Carolina Hospital Association).
63. See, e.g.,James K. Hammitt, et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14J. LEGAL STUD.
751, 754 n.8 (1985) (discussing the perception that the defendants wealth matters); CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 778 (1988) (noting the danger of bias against
wealthy defendants); King, supra note 62, at 1254 (noting "the notorious penchant... to go for
the deep pockets"); VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 4 (quoting the North Carolina Plastic Surgery
Society) and 21 (quoting former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop).
64. See McCoid, supra note 4, at 607-08 (discussing the inadequacy of lay juries to properly
evaluate the conduct of medical experts).
65. Morris, supra note 4, at 1164.
66. King, supra note 62, at 1249.
67. See DANZON, supra note 4, at 140 (describing this view).
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methodologies. One approach compares plaintiff win rates in bench trials
and jury trials, and the other asks both judges and jurors to evaluate the
same evidence. Researchers comparing bench trials with jury trials have
found that plaintiffs in malpractice and product liability actions win
significantly more often in front ofjudges than in front ofjuries.68 However,
it is possible that plaintiffs' success in front of judges may have more to do
with the routing of certain kinds of cases to juries and other types to judges
than with the decision-making tendencies ofjudges and juries themselves. 69
To eliminate this confounding variable, researchers have employed a second
methodology for comparing the decisions ofjudges and juries.
An alternative methodology compares the reactions of judges and
jurors to the same evidence. The most famous of these studies was
undertaken by Kalven and Zeisel in the 1960s.70 They reviewed 4000 civil
trials.7' In nearly four out of five cases (78%), the judge and jury agreed,
thus refuting fears about jury unpredictability and incompetence. 2 As
Clermont and Eisenberg observed, "[tlhis 78% agreement rate is better than
the rate of agreement between scientists doing peer review, employment
interviewers ranking applicants, and psychiatrists and physicians diagnosing
patients."73 In fact, it compares favorably to the rate of agreement among
physicians evaluating the conduct of their peers. A study by Farber and
White, for example, found that internal reviewers examining claims filed
against a self-insured hospital disagreed or filed ambiguous reports over
thirty percent of the time.74
The Kalven and Zeisel study also contained a second interesting
finding. When the judge and jury disagreed, the disagreements did not
reflect a jury bias in favor of plaintiffs. Instead, disagreements were nearly
evenly split between plaintiffs and defendants. 75 Thus, no significant
68. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiicism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1137, 1174 (1992) (discussing findings). Jurors were also
slightly tougher on plaintiffs in automobile accident cases. They were only more favorable to
plaintiffs in marine and FELA cases, and the pro-plaintiff tendency was slight. Id. at 1137.
Another study found a significant pro-defendant bias in product liability cases. See Steven
Landsman et al., Be Careful Wat You Wish For The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for
Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297,334 (discussing findings).
69. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 1174 (suggesting alternative ways of
interpreting studies comparing judge and jury verdicts).
70. HARRYKALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY (1966).
71. Id. at 63-65.
72. KALVEN & ZEIsEL, supra note 70, at 63. Personal injury cases had the same rate of
agreement. Id. at 64 n.12.
73. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 1153.
74. See Henry Farber & Michelle White, Medical Malpractice An EmpificalExamination of the
Litigation Process, 22 RANDJ. ECON. 199, 204-05 (1991) (discussing findings).
75. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 70, at 63-65. Ten percent of the time, the jury favored the
defendant when the judge would have found for the plaintiff, and twelve percent of the time
the jury found for the plaintiff when the judge would have found for the defendant. Id.
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evidence of pro-plaintiff bias was found.
Other more recent studies have also found an absence of pro-plaintiff
bias. A study by Heuer and Penrod involving 160 complex civil and criminal
cases found judge-jury agreement 63% of the time and found that the cases
of disagreement were split about evenly in favor of plaintiffs and
defendants. 76 Another recent study of judge-juror agreement in civil cases
reportedly found that judges are more likely to find for plaintiffs than
77juries.
In addition, recent research has shown that judges continue to give
strong positive evaluations to juries. In the Kalven and Zeisel study, for
example, when judge and jury disagreed, judges usually indicated that the
jury's verdict was reasonable. 78 In another survey of state and federal judges
in Georgia, 94% of the judges felt that juries understood the evidence, and
87% felt that the juries were not pro-plaintiff.79 Fully 100% of the federal
judges and 89% of the state judges agreed that the jury adhered to the
judge's instructions.80 Over 97% of both groups said that they agreed with
jury verdicts more often than was reported in the Kalven and Zeisel study.8'
This evidence of judge-jury concordance rebuts the assumption that
juries are unfairly sympathetic to injured patients and vulnerable to
manipulation by plaintiffs' attorneys.
2. Research on Complex Cases
Despite the evidence that juries perform well in tort trials generally,
some critics doubt that juries perform equally well in complex cases, such as
• 82
those involving antitrust, toxic torts, and medical malpractice. However,
76. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Effects, 18 LAw& HUM. BEHAv. 29,48 tbl.13 (1994).
77. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDIcr: ASSESSING THE CMVLJURY SYSTEM 181, 222-23 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (reporting
on research by Heuer and Penrod). Heuer and Penrod found that judges were considerably
more likely to disagree with jury defense verdicts (52% percent disagreement) than with
plaintiffs' verdicts (29%). Id.
78. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective. 40
ARIz. L. REV. 849,853 (1998).
79. Perry Sentell, The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the (Federal) Bench, 27 GA. L.
REV. 59, 116 (1992) [hereinafter Sentell, Federal Bench]. All the federal judges and 98% of the
state judges felt that jury performance was satisfactory or would be if some procedural reforms
were adopted. Id. at 117. See generally Perry Sentell, The Georgia Juy and Negligence: The View from
the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85 (1991).
80. See Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 79, at 117. A 1987 Louis Harris survey of 1000
judges found nearly complete support for this proposition. Louis Harris & Assocs., Judges
Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half of
Their Time on Ceneral Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746 (1989) (noting that nearly all judges
believed jurors attempted to apply the law as instructed).
81. See Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 79, at 115.
82. See, e.g., Douglas Ell, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and
the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REv. 775, 775-76 (1978) (questioning jury competence in a
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the evidence on judgejury concordance in complex cases is very favorable.
In one study of malpractice trials, for example, juries were harder on
plaintiffs than judges were. 3 Likewise, the Heuer and Penrod study of
complex cases found that judge-jury disagreement was not related to trial
complexity.8
In their famous study of criminal trials, Kalven and Zeisel found not
only that judges and juries agreed most of the time, but also that this
agreement rate was not affected by the difficulty of the case.85 When judge
and jury did disagree, the judges did not attribute this disagreement to the
816jury's misunderstanding of complex cases. Instead, disagreements
appeared most often in cases where community values were important.
7
Kalven and Zeisel thus concluded that jurors generally comprehend
complex evidence.88
Thus, judges seem satisfied by the performance of jurors, even in
complex cases. In addition to the Kalven and Zeisel study, the Federal
Judicial Center undertook a study of judicial satisfaction with juries. In the
lengthy, difficult trials examined by that study, the trial judges believed that
the jury had almost always made the correct decision or applied the law ably
to the facts. 89
However, evidence that judges and juries agree does not rule out the
possibility that both judges and juries have misunderstood complex
evidence. Efforts to study jury comprehension more directly have yielded
inconsistent results. Several experimental studies indicate that mock jurors
tend both to underuse probabilistic evidence" and to overestimate the odds
complex commercial case); Kirk Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1365, 1366 (1989) (arguing for a nonjury
system for medical malpractice cases); Stephen Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law
Leaving Scientific Disputes to Scientists, 248 Sci. 823 (1990) (questioning jury competence to
evaluate complex scientific concepts in personal injury cases).
83. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 68.
84. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 76, at 49. Another study found that mock jurors relied
primarily on the content of expert testimony in less complex cases but that they were more
persuaded in more complex cases by testimony from a more highly expert than from a less
expert witness. SeeJoel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?,
20 LAWv& HUM. BEHAv. 379, 379 (1996).
85. See KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 70, at 157-58.
86. See Kalven, supra note 71, at 1066-67 (finding that judges did not doubt jury
understanding); see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 76, at 49 (finding that "judicial satisfaction
with the jury's performance did not vary with the complexity of the case").
87. SeeKALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 70, at 116-17.
88. 1& at 158.
89. GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TIALs: VIvS FROM THE BENCH AND THE
BAR 26 (1981).
90. SeeJoe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Diffcult Issues: Lessons from CivilJury Trials,
40 A.M. U.L. REV. 727, 757-69 (1991) (reviewing the empirical literature); David L. Faigman &
A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical
Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (1988) (finding that mock jurors underestimated the
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of low probability hazards. 9' Yet, researchers have also found that people
.can freely use statistical information when its situational applicability is
made apparent."92 In actual litigation, therefore, a presentation by an expert
witness may adequately clarify the use to which applicable statistics should be
put. The authors concluded that "it does not appear particularly difficult to
arrange the conditions under which various statistical notions are perceived
as situationally applicable and consequently are used as the basis for
judgments. "93 That finding is consistent with the results in other studies,94
one of which found that jurors are more likely to use the probability
testimony if it contains hypothetical examples linked directly to the case.95
Other small studies have criticized juror comprehension. One study
interviewed jurors who had heard a complicated antitrust case and
concluded that jurors have difficulty understanding economic testimony
involving concepts such as "market power" and "natural monopoly."96 Other
interviewers have concluded that jurors need assistance with esoteric
evidence. 97 However, these conclusions have usually been reached in studies
that had very small samples (some interviewing jurors from only one or two
trials), and some were reported by journalists not trained in the scientific
method.98
Bayesian significance of statistical evidence about blood typing and that testimony from a
statistician describing the Bayesian significance did not alter this); William C. Thompson, Are
Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9,
33 (stating that "most subjects ... give less weight to evidence of a match than Bayes' theorem
says they should").
91. See Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 90, at 7-13 (discussing study results); Brian C.
Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 49, 60-70 (1996)
(discussing study results). See generally Cecil et al., supra note 90, at 756-60 (reviewing the
literature).
92. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Lay Persons'Sensitivity to Statistical Information: The Case of High
Perceived Applicability, 46J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 503 (1984). When the testimony
was more abstractjurors were less able or willing to use it in their decision making. Id.
93. Id. at 516.
94. See id. at 515 (reviewing other studies).
95. See Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A
Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 381 (1988) (discussing study
results).
96. See ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE
STUDY 82, 85-86 (1984).
97. See STEPHENJ. ADLER, THEJURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 218-
42 (1994) (discussing factors that would lead to better juries); MOLLY SELViN & LARRY PICUS,
THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 24-26
(1987) (describingjuror confusion in several cases); see a/soJoseph Sanders,Jury Deliberation in a
Complex Case: Havener v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 57-58, 65 (1993)
(concluding that juror comprehension fell short of ideal but attributing this to problems with
the judge's instructions and the defense lawyers' presentation of the case). But seeVidmar, supra
note 78, at 857-58 (critiquing these criticisms).
98. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 888 (1999) [hereinafter Lempert, Failures of a
[2002]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 926 2001-2002
MODERN MALPRACTICE LAW
In addition, these unfavorable reports have not considered the
possibility that the jury's group deliberations can cure the problems found
in individual juror comprehension. Researchers have discovered that mock
jurors can and do correct each other's factual mistakes.9 9 One study found
that, although individual juror recollection of facts and instructions was
rather weak, pooled recollections resulted in 90% recall of facts and 80%
recall of instructions. 1°° Other studies have found that juror comprehension
varies significantly among individuals, but that the most able jurors take
leadership roles and tutor the others.101 Consequently, group deliberations
appear to improve the ability ofjuries to adjudicate complex cases fairly. 10 2
Others studies of criminal and civil trials have found that juries have
mechanisms for managing complex evidence. 13 In an ABA study of four
extremely complex cases, for example, the researchers found that while
juror comprehension varied widely among individual jurors, the most
capable jurors helped other jurors by explaining the evidence and legal
. • 104
rules and leading the discussion. The jurors were not overly influenced by
experts, recognizing conflicts and rejecting those experts who most seemed
like "hired guns."105Jurors gave greatest weight to those experts, like treating
physicians, who had a personal relationship with the parties, and to those
whose testimony was most understandable. 10 6 This study also uncovered
several ways that lawyers and judges can improve jury comprehension,
including organizing the evidence conscientiously, demonstrating the
relevance of key evidence more clearly, and explaining complex legal issues
more completely.0 7
Overall, therefore, the evidence on complex trials is reassuring. The
most rigorous studies have failed to find any evidence that failures of
Social Science] (stating that one study was "partly grounded in empirical research"); Vidmar,
supra note 78, at 857 (describing the statistics).
99. Phoebe C. Elhvorth, Are Twelve Head Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Autumn 1989, at 225; cf REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THEJURY88 (1983).
100. SeeHASTiEETAL, supra note 99, at 81.
101. SeeABA, infra note 104 at 16, 22.
102. Cf VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 275 (expressing confidence injury verdicts, at least if the
jury has twelve members).
103. See Lempert, supra note 77, at 183-90 (reporting on thirteen complex cases in which
there no clear evidence ofjury confusion).
104. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, ABA LmGATION SEC., JURY
COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES 16, 22 (1989).
105. Id. at 40; Vidmar, supra note 78, at 863-64 (reviewing the literature); see also VDMAR,
supra note 62, at 171-73 (noting research evidence thatjurors take experts with a grain of salt).
One experimental study found that jurors relied on the content of the testimony except in
highly complex cases, where they gave more weight to the experts' credentials. See Cooper et al.,
supra note 84, at 379.
106. See ABA, supra note 104, at 42-43.
107. See Cecil et al., supra note 90, at 754 (suggesting several ways to "improve the
presentation of evidence in complex cases").
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comprehension distort actual jury verdicts. Group deliberations and the
leadership of the most competent jurors appear to cure many of the
problems of understanding experienced by individual jurors. In addition,
judges and attorneys can further improve jury comprehension by better
presentation of the evidence and the law. Finally, difficulties with
comprehension have not been shown to systematically favor one party over
another.1l 8 For these reasons, most researchers believe that juries are
capable of handling complex civil cases.1°9
One researcher who studied nine complex trials concluded as follows:
Throughout this review, strengths of the jury emerge. A close look
at a number of cases, including several in which the jury verdicts
appear mistaken, does not show juries that are befuddled by
complexity. Even when juries do not fully understand technical
issues, they can usually make enough sense of what is going on to
deliberate rationally, and they usually reach defensible decisions.
To the extent that juries make identifiable mistakes, their mistakes
seem most often attributable not to conditions uniquely associated
with complexity, but to mistakes of judges and lawyers, to such
systemic deficiencies of the trial process as battles of experts and
the prevalence of hard-to-understand jury instruction, and to the
kinds of human errors that affect simple trials as well."'
The most troubling remaining doubt about jury capacity in complex
cases arises out of the evidence that lay people have difficulty
comprehending and applying statistical and probabilistic evidence."' The
tendency to overestimate low probability risk could lead jurors to
overestimate the riskiness of the defendant's clinical decisions. However,
studies demonstrating this human tendency may be of limited relevance to
jury performance because the study instruments have given the respondents
far less information than jurors will get at trial.' 2 Experimental evidence
suggests that the tendency of lay persons to overestimate the probability of
low-probability events can be cured by educating them about the actual
108. See Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough , 62
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 748 (1992) (experimentally finding that people are
reluctant to find in favor of plaintiffs who rely on purely probabilistic evidence).
109. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA, 208-13 (1988) (expressing confidence
in jury judgments); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THEJURY 250-51 (1986) (same);
SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 125-27 (1988) (same); Cecil et al., supra note 90, at 733-36, 750-64 (same).
110. Lempert, supra note 77, at 234.
111. This finding is also consistent with the findings of cognitive psychologists in nontrial
settings. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, WhatJuries Can't Do We" The Jury's Performance as Risk
Manager, 40 ARIZ. LJ. 901,909-10 (1998) (reviewing the literature).
112. Lempert, Failures of a Social Science, supra note 98, at 888.
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probabilities. 1 3 Defense counsel can provide that education in malpractice
actions.
A remaining issue is the tendency ofjurors to underutilize probabilistic
evidence in favor of nonstatistical evidence. There is no evidence that the
human propensity to favor nonstatistical proof plays a significant role in
medical malpractice cases or leads to inappropriate or systematically biased
verdicts. Most of the research to date has involved scientific evidence offered
against the accused in a criminal trial. However, there is some evidence that
jurors are less skeptical of scientific evidence when it is used in a civil trial.1 4
In addition, researchers have found that jurors are more likely to use expert
testimony if it contains hypothetical examples linked directly to the case,
rather than abstract examples.1 5 Good tort lawyers know that intuitively.
Thus, the tendency for juries to underuse probabilistic evidence can be
mitigated by explanations or analogies offered during trial to make the
probabilities more salient"n 6 This tendency may also be ameliorated by
group deliberations thereafter. More research is badly needed to provide a
clearer picture ofjury use of probabilistic evidence in realistic settings. Until
then, the case againstjury decision-making lacks convincing evidence.
3. Evidence ofJury-Physician Agreement
Another source of information for evaluating the ability of juries to
understand medical malpractice trials and to resolve them fairly is provided
by studies comparing the outcomes reached by juries with those reached by
physician reviewers. Surprisingly, researchers have found that jury verdicts
are surprisingly consistent and predictable. Where their judgments differ
from those of physicians, juries are consistently more lenient toward
113. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: hat Empirical Research Tells Us about
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICr, supra note 77, at 261 (citing the studies). Any
remaining discrepancies may reflect lay consideration of factors other than mortality that are
not taken into account by risk experts, such as perceived control over the risk, the potential for
catastrophe, likelihood of fatality, inequitable distribution of the risk, and benefits and the
extent to which the activity generates "unknown risks." See Cecil et al., supra note 90, at 762. The
departures, therefore, do not necessarily indicate a failure to comprehend the genuine risks.
114. Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 AM. J.
TRALADvocAcY361, 382 (1992).
115. See Brekke & Borgida, supra note 95, at 372.
116. See Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 479, 502 (1998) (suggesting that trial lawyers can "humanize and simplify even the most
technical scientific evidence"); Dale A. Nance, Bayesian Rationality and Jury-Decision-Making.
Toward an Optimal Presentation Method for Trace Evidence with Relatively Large and Quant/iAable
Random Match Probability 57 (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (studying the
responses of jurors called for service in Kane County, Illinois that "careful use of Bayesian
methods in the courtroom can indeed assist the jury in reaching more accurate verdicts and it
can do so without improper manipulation or deception of the jury"). However, studies have
found that efforts to explain the Bayesian significance of probabilistic evidence does not tend to
increase the weight assigned to the evidence. See generally Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 90.
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malpractice defendants than other physicians would be.117
In the most widely cited study of medical malpractice claims, Mark I.
Taragin and his colleagues reviewed 8231 closed files of one New Jersey
insurance company dating from 1977 to 1992. 11 Each claim had been
reviewed upon receipt by physician consultants and labeled "defensible,"
"indefensible," or "unclear." Juries were much more likely to excuse
physicians in "indefensible" cases than to find against them in "defensible"
cases.119 In the study, juries were even tougher on plaintiffs than physician
reviewers had been.
Another study reached similarly favorable conclusions about jury-
physician agreement. Faber and White reviewed 465 malpractice cases, of
which twenty-six went to trial. 120 Plaintiffs won only four of the trials. 121 The
plaintiffs won two of the four cases in which the defendant's conduct had
been classified as "bad" by the insurer's private reviewers and won only two
of the eleven cases that had been rated as "ambiguous. " 12 2 Plaintiffs lost all of
the thirteen cases in which the medical care was rated as "good." 23 Two
other smaller studies also found that juries are no harder on physicians than
other physicians are.
124
117. SeeVIDMAR, supra note 62, at 161-69, 175-82 (reviewing the literature).
118. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANN. INT. MED. 780, 780-81 (1992).
119. In the cases labeled "indefensible" that went to trial, the plaintiffs won only 42% of the
time. Taragin et al., supra note 118, at 781. They also won 30% of the "unclear" cases. Id.
Although plaintiffs won 21% of the "defensible" cases, id., that finding is consistent with the
authors' hypothesis that the review process missed some indefensible cases. Id. The authors of
the study felt that these classifications were probably biased in favor of the defendant physicians
and understated the amount of negligence because this internal review was undertaken by
fellow physicians and because it was based on limited information. Id. at 782. As a result, the
researchers concluded that "unjustified payments are probably uncommon." Id.
120. Henry Farber & Michelle White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution
in Medical Malpractice, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 802 (1994); see also Farber & White, supra note 74,
at 204-05, 204 tbl.1 (finding that the hospital won all thirteen trials, including one labeled "bad"
and three labeled "ambiguous").
121. Farber & White, supra note 120, at 802.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. FRANK SLOAN ETAL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACIGCE 17-30 (1993). See Vidmar, supra
note 62, at 859 (deducing from the Sloan tables that the rating given to the case by physicians
hired by the researchers was twice as likely to have been "negligent" in cases that the plaintiff
won at trial as in cases that the plaintiff lost and, when plaintiffs lost, that the rating was twice as
likely to have been favorable as when the plaintiff won). In the Liang study, anesthesiologists
practicing in an academic medical center were asked to review twelve scenarios based on actual
jury trials. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an
Anesthesiolog Department, 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 129 (1997). In five of these cases,
there was significant disagreement between the physicians and the actual jury verdict. Id. In
four of those five instances, the jury had exonerated a physician whom the reviewers felt had
given medically inappropriate care. Id. As in the Taragin study, jurors exonerated physician
defendants more readily than other physicians did. Id. at 136.
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When Stephen Daniels and Lori Andrews conducted a similar study in
conjunction with the American Bar Foundation, they evaluated twenty-three
cases involving alleged misuse of oxytocin, they found that plaintiffs won
fourteen of sixteen cases in which evidence of contraindications was
presented at trial and lost six of the seven cases in which evidence of
contraindication was absent.lu
This evidence of jury-physician agreement has important implications.
First, it provides reassurance that juries are not systematically biased against
physicians. Because physicians are reluctant to label the errors of their peers
as negligent, one would expect juries to find physician defendants
negligent more frequently than other physicians do. They, however, do not,
a fact that suggests that jurors commonly give the benefit of the doubt to
physician defendants. Thus, juries appear to take the burden of proof
seriously. If they do not feel comfortable choosing between opposing
experts, they find for the defendant. If the complexity of some malpractice
cases helps anyone, it helps defendants.
4. Summary of the Evidence RegardingJury Capacity
The existing data provide a basis for cautious optimism about jury
capacity. Juries and judges usually agree on liability, even in complex cases.
Juries and physicians also tend to agree, although juries tend to exonerate
defendants more readily than physicians do. The evidence, therefore,
indicates thatjuries do a reasonably competentjob.
That optimism must be tempered by the evidence that ordinary people
have problems estimating risks and using probabilities. There are several
reasons not to overreact to this evidence, however. Most importantly,
educating jurors about actual risk can significantly improve jury
comprehension. In addition, the tendency of lay persons to underuse
probabilistic evidence is mitigated by explanations and analogies offered
during trial and, perhaps, by the jury's own deliberations. Furthermore,
the lay propensity to favor nonstatistical proof does not appear to lead juries
to reach inappropriate verdicts; jury verdicts closely match the conclusions
reached byjudges and physicians. Moreover, many malpractice cases are not
technically complicated (e.g., wrong dosage cases) and others turn on
125. Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Obstetrics and
Gynecology Cases, in 3 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE
(Victoria P. Rostow & RogerJ. Bulger eds., 1989), cited in Neil Vidmar, AreJuries Competent to
Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific Medical Issues?, 43 EMORY LJ. 885, 906 n.72 (1994)
[hereinafter Vidmar, Competent].
126. See HARvARD MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY GROUP, MEDICAL CARE AND MEDICAL
INJURIES IN THE STATE OF NEWYORK: A PILOT STUDY 10 (1982) (making this observation); PAUL
C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION 125 (1993) (same); Taragin et al., supra note 118, at 782 (same).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07 (discussing jury use of probabilistic
evidence).
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1281crucial issues of credibility (e.g., what was said or done). In all states, the
jury will be assisted by witnesses who tell the jury what the customary clinical
practices are and why they are customary. In reasonable care states, they will
also hear what respected medical bodies recommend in their clinical
practice guidelines. These recommendations are likely to carry great weight
unless a convincing reason for departure is offered. Thus, the argument that
juries lack the tools with which to decide malpractice cases fairly seems
misplaced.
B. BIAS AGA1NSTPHYSICIANS
Conventional wisdom assumes that juries will sympathize with injured
plaintiffs and will penalize wealthy physician defendants. In fact, jurors
sympathize more with the physicians who are sued than with the patients
who sue them.
1. Survey Evidence of Pro-Physician Bias
An expanding body of evidence suggests that jurors begin their
deliberations favoring physician-defendants and doubting the motives of
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. 129 Ellen L. Leggett found that one-
third of the potential jurors she studied believed that malpractice plaintiffs
are looking for easy money. 3 She found that potential jurors are even more
distrustful of plaintiff's lawyers than they are of plaintiffs; two-thirds believe
that plaintiff's lawyers have pressured dissatisfied plaintiffs into filing suit.1
31
Many of her respondents believed that medical malpractice suits ruin the
health care system by driving up costs.1
32
Neil Vidmar has also found that potential jurors are concerned about
plaintiff motives and excessive litigation. 133 In his study of North Carolina
juries, Vidmar noted that voir dire often produced remarks like "too many
people sue their doctors" and "it is just going to raise the health insurance
rates for the rest of us."134 Although researchers have not yet explored the
role that cognitive dissonance plays in this phenomenon, the need to trust
128. Vidmar, Competent, supra note 62, at 898-99.
129. In addition to the studies described in the text, an interesting study of Ohio jury
verdicts found that physicians were treated more favorably than other health care workers, even
after controlling for injury severity and type of malpractice alleged. Deborah Jones Merritt &
Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 315, 392
(1999).
130. Ellen L. Leggett, Identifying Juror Bias and Their Impact on Cases, available at
http://v.jri-inc.com/articles.htm (last modified Sept. 7, 1999).
131. Id.; see Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage
Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 805, 817 (1991) (finding that most jurors believed attorneys
encouraged people to file frivolous lawsuits).
132. See Leggett, supra note 130 (discussing the findings).
133. VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 169-70.
134. Id. at 169.
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physicians with one's own life certainly gives each of us a powerful motive to
assume that physicians are rarely careless.
Skepticism about plaintiffs is not confined to people who sue their
doctors. Valerie Hans and William Lofquist found the same anti-plaintiff
skepticism in their study of Delaware jurors in cases involving tort claims
against business defendants. 135 Four of five jurors surveyed agreed that
"people are too quick to sue" and that "there are far too many frivolous
lawsuits today."136 Only one-third felt that "most people who sue others in
• .• • . •"137
court have legitimate grievances. The researchers were surprised by these
findings, concluding:
Rather than revealing jurors willing or eager to impose on business
the costs of plaintiffs' injuries, our findings show that jurors were
suspicious of the legitimacy of plaintiffs' claims and concerned
about the personal and social costs of large jury awards... [J]urors
were generally favorable toward business, skeptical more about the
profit motives of individual plaintiffs than of business defendants,
and committed to holding down awards.sa
These findings are consistent with other studies that have found
widespread public concern about overeagerness to sue. l3a Publicity about the
tort crisis has made citizens deeply concerned about excessive litigation and
insurance costs. 140 People who start a decision-making process with pro-
defendant biases of this kind may find it difficult to abandon their
preconceptions when presented with contrary evidence.
2. Plaintiff Win Rates
The fear of pro-plaintiff bias is also not substantiated by the data on
plaintiff win rates. The empirical literature on tort win rates is exhaustively
summarized in Hans and Vidmar's book Judging the Jury. According to their
135. Valerie P. Hans & William Lofquist, Jurors'Judgnents of Business Liability in Tort Cases:
Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 85, 85 (1992) [hereinafter
Hans & Lofquist, Juror's Judgments]; see also Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Perceptions of
CivilJustice: The Litigation Crisis Attitudes of CivilJurors, 12 BEHAV. SCL & L. 181, 187 [hereinafter
Hans & Lofquist, CivilJustice] (1994) (reporting on a larger sample).
136. Hans & LofquistJurors'Jdgments, supra note 135, at 93.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song. Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Injuries in
an American Community, 18 LAw & Soc'Y. REv. 551,553, 559-61 (1984) (finding that citizens in a
rural Illinois county disapproved of "cashing in" via personal injury lawsuits and characterized
those who did sue as "people looking for the easy buck"). Not all jurors will share these beliefs.
Hans & LofquistJurors'Judgments, supra note 135, at 96.
140. Greene et al., supra note 131, at 809; Hans & Lofquist, Civil Justice, supra note 135, at
213; VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 171. This concern is associated with lowerjury awards. See Hans &
Lofquist,Juror'sJudgements, supra note 135, at 97 (1992); see also Greene et al., supra note 131, at
816 (noting thatjurors who favored tort reform gave lower awards).
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meta-analysis of the empirical data, malpractice plaintiffs have a
considerably lower win rate (roughly 30%) than automobile accident victims
(60-70%) . In other studies the difference is even greater.42 In fact,
malpractice cases typically have the lowest success rate of any category of
torts. Although this pattern could be explained by many factors-such as
unique settlement patterns in malpractice actions or the custom-based
standard of care itself-the pattern certainly does not provide any evidence
of pro-plaintiff bias.
3. The Absence of Evidence of Deep Pockets Bias
Although the research on this subject is thin, the existing data also fails
to confirm a jury bias against "deep pocket" defendants.143 That finding is
consistent with the low win rate of plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases,'44
where the defendant is presumptively wealthy and insured.1
45
4. Summary
There is simply no evidence that juries are prejudiced against physician
defendants or that their verdicts are distorted by their sympathy for injured
plaintiffs. Instead, the existing evidence strongly indicates that jurors begin
their task harboring sympathy for the defendant physician and skepticism
about the plaintiff. This survey data is consistent with the evidence, discussed
in the previous subsection, that juries treat physicians more favorably than
other physicians do.146 Although it is possible that growing public
antagonism toward managed care practices will reverse these sympathies, no
evidence of backlash against individual physicians has surfaced to date.
141. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 109, at 251 (summarizing empirical evidence); see also
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 62, at 12 (stating a 32% win rate); Robert MacCoun, supra note
113, at 137, 148 (noting a 33% win rate); MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1240 (1992) (finding
a 34% win rate). One major study of state tort judgments found that, overall, tort plaintiffs
succeeded 49% of the time. BrianJ. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury
in the 1990's, 79JUDICATURE 233, 235 (1996) (describing the study results).
142. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 62, at 127 (stating that the national win rate of
plaintiffs was 30.4% from 1988-90, but varied considerably between states); VIDMAR, supra note
62, at 20, 43-44; see also Vidmar, Competent, supra, note 125, at 892-93 (collecting studies on jury
outcomes).
143. See Merritt & Barry, supra note 129, at 359 (reporting on a study of Ohio cases); see also
id. at 393-94 (concluding that at the very least, a bias would depend on a huge interplay of
factors).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
145. However, there is evidence that juries hold corporations to a higher standard of
responsibility than individuals. For a review of this literature, see Vidmar, supra note 78, at 870-
71.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 117-26 (reviewing the studies).
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C. JURY UNWLLINGNESS TO CONSMER COSTS
A more recent concern about jury decision-making is that jurors will
refuse to take costs into account. If they are unwilling to do so, jurors may
insist on socially unwarranted safety precautions.
This issue has surfaced most prominently in academic discussions of
punitive damage awards in product liability actions. Gary Schwartz and Kip
Viscusi both concluded that juries have a distaste for explicit cost-benefit
analysis by automobile manufacturers.147 Schwartz concluded that 'juries
have often proved hostile to the core public-policy idea that high monetary
costs can justify a reduction in health or safety." 48 Commenting on the
possibility, Schwartz observed, "[I] t seems sensible to recognize in all of this
an instance of the 'two cultures' problem. A culture has developed around
public policy analysts that sees the risk-benefit criterion as obviously
acceptable; but the culture of public opinion itself tends to regard that
criterion as distressing."
1 4 9
Ifjuries are unwilling to allow physicians and health plans to take costs
into account, then giving them power to set medical standards could also
thwart responsible efforts to contain health care costs and make health
insurance more affordable. 15° If jurors cannot be trusted to apply a
reasonable physician standard with sensitivity to the cost implications, then
courts may want to continue to delegate the power to determine the legally
required standard of care to the medical profession.
At present, we know virtually nothing about the jury's willingness to
consider costs when making decisions about reasonable care. The clues are
contradiftory. Viscusi has conducted two experimental studies of punitive
damages in which he found that explicit risk-benefit analysis by corporate
defendants slightly increased the incidence of punitive damage awards (by
eight percent 51 and five percent1 2 ). He concluded that risk-benefit analysis
147. See, Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REv. 1013, 1035
(1991) (contending that the public has considerable ambivalence about risk-benefit balancing,
especially by private corporations); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52
STAN. L. REv., 547, 588 (2000) (concluding that risk-benefit analysis is penalized byjuries).
148. See Gary Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: Wat Its Effect Would be on American
Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1339, 1373 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz,
National CareProgram].
149. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 1041.
150. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & Matthew L. Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Courts:
Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 26J. HEALTH, POL, POL'Y & L. 291 (discussing the willingness
of juries to tolerate explicitly cost-conscious medical treatment decisions); Schwartz, National
Care Program, supra note 148, at 1373. If the health care industry is to strike a reasonable balance
between quality and affordability and is to allocate the available resources rationally, then jurors
need to consider the overall population's interest in access, not just the interests of the injured
party before the court.Jacobson & Kanna, supra at 13, 25.
151. Viscusi, supra note 147, at 557. Risk-benefit analysis also increased the magnitude of
the awards. Viscusi also found that mock jurors do not appear to use traditional risk-utility
analysis when asked to sit in the shoes of a corporate CEO and make decisions about safety
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is penalized even when it is consistent with the risk analysis used by
government agencies. However, the significance of these findings is clouded
by the failure of the survey instruments to instruct the jurors about the legal
status of risk-utility analysis and the absence of explanations of defendant's
methods by defense counsel. In addition, both studies interviewed individual
subjects. Thus, they lacked the deliberations that characterize actual trials. 53
Some view the large punitive damages verdicts recently awarded against
managed care organizations as evidence that juries will not tolerate cost-
conscious medicine. However, several other clues point to a contrary
conclusion. First, the jurisdictions that have abandoned the custom-based
standard of care do not appear to have experienced any unique crises as a
result. Second, many malpractice cases involve underlying resource
allocation issues, such as whether more tests or treatments should have been
offered. 1 4 Yet, defendants win two-thirds of the malpractice trials.
15 5
Third, resource allocation questions are implicit in all negligence cases.
When, for example, ajury decides that a grocery store employee should have
patrolled and cleaned the aisles more frequently or that a reasonable grocer
would have installed non-slip plastic mats in front of produce counters, the
jury is deciding that these safety precautions are more important than a
lower price for groceries and more important than the other goods and
services that could have been purchased with the additional money now
devoted to groceries. Yet, there is no evidence that juries ignore costs in
these cases; to the contrary, they resolve these cases just asjudges would.156
Fourth and finally, a little-known 1968 study by Edward Green found
that mock juries appropriately consider both risks and costs. 157 Furthermore,
his findings suggest that the current failure of trial courts to instruct juries in
risk-utility calculus probably does not matter. His subjects took risk-utility
precautions. However, they were not asked whether they would find that the CEO who failed to
do so was negligent. They were not given a legal standard of care to apply. Instead, they used
their own personal norms to make an ex ante safety decision. Id.
152. See Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEG. STUD.
107, 123 (2001) (finding that undertaking a risk analysis increased the probability of a punitive
damages award by 0.05).
153. See Lempert, supra note 112, at 877.
154. This fact is relevant even in jurisdictions using a custom-based standard of care, for it
indicates thatjuries will respect a resources-based custom.
155. Supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
156. Supra text accompanying notes 68-81. In jurisdictions that give a risk-utility jury
instruction, the resource implications of the negligence standard are made even more patent
for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(suggesting that reasonableness requires balancing of risk and utility); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 291 (1975) (same). There is no evidence that the juries ignore this instruction in
either malpractice cases or ordinary tort cases. In fact, the concordance ofjury verdicts with the
conclusions ofjudges strongly suggests thatjurors do not ignore costs.
157. See Edward Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial Reality?, 2 LAW &
SOC'Y REv. 241, 245 (1968) (describing the "calculus of risk formula" applied by mostjuries).
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most clearly into account when they were given no instructions about risk-
utility calculus.M'
None of these clues completely allay the suspicion that juries will be
uncomfortable with medical decisions that take costs into account.
5 9
However, neither the existence nor the magnitude of this discomfort has
been demonstrated.
D. HINDSaGHT BIAs
In negligence litigation, defendants are supposed to be judged by the
reasonableness of their conduct, not by its outcome.'6° Yet, cognitive
psychologists know that judgments made in hindsight are routinely distorted
by two cognitive heuristics. The first, hindsight bias, makes bad outcomes
seem more predictable in hindsight than they were ex ante.161 The second,
outcome bias, leads people to assume that individuals who cause accidents
have been careless. 162 Because of these biases (which are commonly referred
to collectively as "hindsight bias"), jurors may treat tort defendants
unfairly.163 One potential solution is to rely on an ex ante standard of care-
158. See id. at 248, 255 (analyzing the effect of a jury instruction on mock juries). He
speculated that the risk-utility instructions that he used had been confusing. Id. at 255.
159. David Eddy has described the unwillingness to consider health care costs as the "cost
taboo." David M. Eddy, Balancing Cost and Quality in Fee-for-Service Versus Managed Care, HEALTH
AFF., May-June 1997, at 162, 169. Richard Epstein and Alan Sykes argue that the public is unable
to reconcile its inconsistent demands for low premiums ex ante with its desire for
comprehensive coverage ex post. Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed
Care: Vicarious Liability, Class Actions and the Patient's Bill of Rights, Social Science Research
Network Electronic Library, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=253328 (last
visited FEB. 6, 2002).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("Negligence is conduct which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unrealistic risk of
harm.").
161. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 0 Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288
(1975) (reporting that once an outcome is known, its probability seems higher).
162. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.
PERSONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL 569, 570 (1988) (describing as experiment in which an actor was
adjudged more "responsible" when the outcome was severe); Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of
Outcome on Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 JAMA 1957, 1960 (1991) (outlining
results from a study);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L. REv. 571, 581 n.36 (1998) (collecting studies on outcome bias); Dan Zakay, The
Evaluation of Managerial Decisions' Quality by Managers, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 49, 52 tbl.1, 55
(1984) (stating that outcome is the most important indicator of decision quality in the eyes of
professional managers).
163. Individuals who know that a bad outcome has occurred tend to evaluate prior conduct
more harshly than they would if they were unaware of the actual outcome. See Kim A. Kamin &
Jeff eyJ. Rachlinski, Ex Post 9 Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsigh 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
89, 90 (1995) ("In making such judgments, people overestimate both probability of the known
outcome and the ability of decision makers to foresee the outcome."); D.Jordan Lowe & Philip
M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION
Scl. 401,403 (reviewing the literature).
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such as adherence to industry custom-that has been set before the bad
outcome occurred and, thus, is insulated from these biases.1 64 Some courts
have justified their deference to medical customs on this basis 68
Although hindsight bias does constitute a potentially serious obstacle to
fair verdicts, the readiness to transfer standard-setting power from the courts
to the regulated industry may be premature. Several factors are likely to
reduce the risk of hindsight bias in actual jury trials. In addition, any
advantage conferred upon plaintiffs by hindsight bias may be offset by other
aspects of the judicial process that favor defendants.
1. Factors that May Reduce Hindsight Bias in Actual Trials
The litigation process differs in important respects from the
experimental studies that have directly observed the effect of hindsight bias.
Actual jury trials have higher stakes, 16  more robust facts, 167 individual
accountability' 68 and group deliberations. 169 Each of these differences has
164. See Rachlinski, supra note 162, at 608. Although Rachlinski acknowledged that industry
customs would sometimes be a poor proxy for reasonability, he concluded that medical customs
were likely to reflect an efficient level of safety precautions. Id. at 610-12.
165. See Osborn v. Irvin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985).
166. Two experimental studies suggest that people can reduce their susceptibility to their
biases when it is important enough for them to do so. SeeJennifer D. Campbell & Abraham
Tesser, Motivational Interpretations of Hindsight Bias: An Individual Difference Analysis, 51 J.
PERSONALITY 605, 616 (1983); Elizabeth Creyer & William T. Ross, Jr., Hindsight Bias and
Inferences in Choice: The Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort, 55 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 61, 71-75 (1993); see also Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington,
Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 671, 680-
81 (1998) (finding that appeals to justice removed the bias). This is consistent with other
studies which have found that "people tend to listen to contrary evidence and to people unlike
themselves when motivation is high to reach a correct answer or an answer they will need to
defend to others." MichaelJ. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. LJ. 1, 30 (1997); see also Russell H. Fazio, Motives for Social
Comparison: The Construction-Validation Distinction, 37J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL 1683, 1683
(1979) (noting that information comparisons occur more when the judgment is important);
Arie W. Kruglanski & Ofra Mayseless, Motivational Effects in the Social Comparison of Opinions, 53J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 834, 837 (1987) (finding that persons with a high fear of
invalidity compare their views more with people who disagree).
167. Given a shortage of facts with which study subjects must make judgments about
probabilities or reasonability, researchers have hypothesized that the subjects may place an
undue emphasis on outcome information. At a trial, by contrast, jurors will hear a much richer
version of the facts, including exculpatory evidence from the defendant. See, e.g., Baron &
Hershey, supra note 162, at 578 (reporting results of a study in which subjects displayed
outcome bias); Lempert, supra note 77, at 192-94 (discussing the complex fact scenarios that
juries hear); Lowe & Reckers, supra note 163, at 404 (discussing the difference between studies
and trials).
168. Significant experimental evidence suggests that people who feel personally
accountable for their decisions put substantially more cognitive work into their decisions.
Cvetkovitch, for example, concluded that accountability produced less "intuitive" and more
.analytic" modes of thought. See George Cvetkovitch, Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and
[2002]
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the potential to reduce hindsight bias."'
A number of procedural reforms also have the potential to reduce
hindsight bias. These strategies include bifurcating the trial of liability and
damages,17' reinstituting unanimous verdicts,1 72 and permitting jurors to
take notes and ask questions. 173 Bifurcation, in particular, is a promising
option, 174 even though the bifurcation of liability and damages is not yet
Social Responsibility, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 149, 149-50 (1978) (reviewing the literature). Tetlock
found that accountability caused his subjects to think about issues in a "more integratively
complex" way. SeePhilip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45J. PERSONALITY&
SOC. PSYCHOL 74, 81 (1983) (reviewing the literature). Juries are likely to resist cognitive
shortcuts to the extent that they feel accountable to others. See id. at 82 (analyzing study
results).
169. Group deliberations have the potential to reduce the impact of the hindsight biases.
See Rachlinski, supra note 162, at 587 n.76 (analyzing group decision making). Jurors must
explain their conclusions to their peers during deliberations and must also listen to the
contrary thoughts of other jurors, including alternative theories about the alleged negligence of
the defendants. Thus, the group deliberations that occur in actual jury trials actively engage
individual jurors in a "consider the opposite" debiasing exercise that resembles the most
successful debiasing experiments. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:
Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1277, 1286-89 (1999) (reviewing the literature
on cognitive debiasing strategies). The few studies done thus far have found that deliberations
by groups of three to five slightly reduce the hindsight bias. See Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly,
Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J.
628, 631 (1988); Dagmar Stahlberg et a., We Knew It All Along Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 55-56 (1995) ("[G~roups were less
likely than individuals to fall prey to hindsight distortions."). Larger groups might increase that
effect.
170. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1300-03 (discussing the "distinguishing characteristics of
actual jury trials" and how these characteristics-gravity of the proceedings, accountability,
robust facts, and group deliberations-help to minimize hindsight bias).
171. See Hal P. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The BusinessJudgment Rul
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 633 (1994) (discussing bifurcation process);
ChristineJols et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1528-29
(1998) (same); David Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight
Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. Sct. & L. 485,
503 (1989) (making the first recommendation of bifurcation). But see Rachlinski, supra note
162, at 605 (concluding that the debiasing potential is limited). Bifurcation will not eliminate
the bias, since the jury will be aware that the plaintiff has been injured, but it might reduce the
bias by minimizing the extent to which the jury learns of the severity of the plaintiff's injuries.
172. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1306-07 (discussing how unanimity forces more
deliberation). Jurors deliberate differently when they know that their verdict need not be
unanimous. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 99, at 184-85 (finding that deliberations were longer
and more robust under a unanimity rule). Hans and Vidmar concluded that "[ulnanimityjuries
were more thorough in their evaluation of the evidence and the law; (and] jurors in the
minority participated more actively in the discussion." HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 109, at 175;
see also MacCoun, supra note 113, at 161 (discussing unanimous verdicts). This is precisely the
kind of active deliberation process necessary to reorientjurors to a foresight perspective.
173. SeePeters, supra note 169, at 1308-09 (reviewing these proposals).
174. Zeisel and Callahan reported in 1963 that defense verdicts rose from 34% to 56%
when trials were bifurcated. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving A
StatisticalAnalysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1612 tbl.3 (1963). In addition, a 1992 simulation study
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common in ordinary negligence actions.175
In addition, judges have other tools for disarming pro-plaintiff biases. 7 1
For example, judges can inform jurors about the burden of proof early in
the trial177 and instruct them to deliberate before voting. 17 Each has the
potential to reduce hindsight bias.
Finally and most importantly, defense counsel can and do attempt to
reduce hindsight bias. They use voir dire, an opening statement, expert
witnesses, evidence of customary norms, and a closing argument to persuade
the jury that the defendant's action was reasonable at the time that it was
undertaken. There is some reason to believe that they can be at least
partially successful.
Until recently, the most successful experimental strategies for reducing
hindsight bias had been designed to weaken the causal link that people
prematurely construct between the known outcome and the antecedent
behavior.179 In particular, subjects were encouraged to consider seriously the
by Horowitz and Bordens found that plaintiffs won less often when liability and damages were
bifurcated (62.5% v. 87.5%). Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental
Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 269, 281-85 (1990).
However, plaintiffs' awards were higher. Id.; see also VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 275 (discussing
bifurcation). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize bifurcated trials. FED R. CIV. P.
42(b).
175. Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal TrialJudges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731,
744 tbls.5.2 & 5.4 (1989) (referring to judges' bifurcated trials).
176. However, jury instructions that warn the jury not to use hindsight, standing alone, are
unlikely to have a significant impact on the bias. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1305 (describing
studies showing that instructions from a mockjudge did not reduce hindsight bias). In addition
to the tools described in the text, judges can improve the chances that accountability will
reduce hindsight bias by admonishing jurors not to discuss the case prior to submission or to
vote on the case before discussing the facts. Id. at 1301. Accountability is most likely to reduce
bias if the accountable individual is unaware of the views of the person to whom she is
accountable. Tetock, supra note 168, at 81.
177. Early instruction on the burden of proof has been shown to produce more not guilty
verdicts in criminal trials. SeeJonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The
Effects of Changes in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CML JURY SYSTEM,
supra note 77, at 414, 445 (citing Saul W. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements
of Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1877, 1877-87 (1979)). It doubles the time thatjurors spend discussing the burden of
proof. See id. (citing REID HASTIE, FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL INSTITUrE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1983) (unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University)). And it
increases the odds that jurors will defer their verdict decisions until the evidence is complete.
See id. at 446.
178. Early voting can lock jurors into positions and reduce the debiasing power of group
deliberations. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1308 (discussing the disadvantages of early voting).
179. Individuals who are given outcome information are believed to assimilate it with the
limited information that they already know to build a coherent story. See Fischhoff, supra note
161, at 297 (referring to experimental strategies for reducing hindsight bias); Lowe & Reckers,
supra note 163, at 405 (same). When they are given information about a bad outcome, they
"rewrite the story" so that the beginning and middle provide a causal explanation for what they
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evidence suggesting that other outcomes were also possible. 80 For example,
researchers have reduced or eliminated hindsight bias by informing their
subjects that positive outcomes were possible and then asking the subjects to
explain these positive outcomes.18 This exercise moves individuals from a
hindsight to a foresight perspective, i.e., from a perspective that merely
requires the explanation of one outcome to one that requires consideration
of multiple possible outcomes.18 2 Cognitive strategies of this kind have had
considerable, although not uniform, success in reducing hindsight bias.8 3
Defense counsel can employ similar tactics to prevent the jury from
greasing only one causal pathway. By helping the jury see the alternatives
that seemed possible ex ante and by explaining why the defendant felt her
choice was reasonable at the time, defense counsel can involve the jury in
precisely the same kind of "consider the opposite" exercise that has proven
successful in experimental settings.18
So far, however, very little research has been undertaken to explore
whether the efforts of defense counsel can fulfill this promise. Two
important studies using cognitive strategies in simulated trial settings have
had mixed results1s5 A study by Stallard and Worthington eliminated two-
thirds of the hindsight bias by having defense counsel remind mock jurors
in closing argument that the plaintiff wanted them to be a "Monday
morning quarterback" and warning the jurors not to use hindsight or
second-guess the defendants.186 However, a study by Kamin and Rachlinski
found no reduction in bias after having the judge warn mock jurors about
the danger of hindsight judgments and having both judge and defense
now know to be the end. Lowe & Reckers, supra note 163, at 405-06; David A. Schkade & Lynda
M. Kilboume, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 107 (1991). Thus, they build a story from back to front.
Thereafter, they view the actual outcome as natural and find it difficult to see how alternative
outcomes could have occurred.
180. SeePeters, supra note 169, at 1286-89 (reviewing the literature).
181. See, e.g., Hal IR Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305,
305 (1988) (attacking hindsight bias by asking subjects to think concretely about alternative
outcomes); Lowe & Reckers, supra note 163, at 414 (providing subjects with alternative positive
outcomes to consider); Michelle R. Nario & Nyla R. Branscombe, Comparison Processes in
Hindsight and Caused Attribution, 21 PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. 1244, 1249 (1995)
(asking subjects to explain alternative outcomes); Peters, supra note 169, at 1286-89; Paul Slovic
& Baruch Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORmANCE 544,544 (1977) (same).
182. SeeLowe & Reckers, supra note 163, at 406 (making this point).
183. See Peters, supra note 169, at 1286-89 (discussing cognitive strategies).
184. To help make these efforts successful, judges can prepare jurors by giving them
instructions that explain both the dangers of hindsight bias and how it operates. Wexler &
Schopp, supra note 171, at 492.
185. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 163, at 94-98 (finding little impact). But see Stallard
& Worthington, supra note 166, at 679 (finding a substantial reduction in hindsight bias).
186. See Stallard & Worthington, supra note 166, at 679 tbl.3 (finding that their strategy
reduced the increase attributable to hindsight from 28% to 8%, a reduction of over 70%).
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counsel encourage the jury to "think of all the ways" that the accident could
have happened.1 7 Consequently, the research testing this debiasing strategy
is inconclusive.
More intriguing is a very recent study by Kathryn Kadous.ss She
hypothesized that hindsight bias was a product of affect, rather than
cognition, and that negative outcomes cause people to feel both increased
levels of negative affect and increased motivation to lay blame. 8 9 She
therefore attempted to eliminate hindsight bias by reducing juror reliance
on affect as a basis for laying blame. Her strategy was stunningly simple: she
merely told her mock jurors that they might feel anxious and tense, as actual
jurors do, because they are making difficult decisions."3° This maneuver
completely eliminated the hindsight bias, even though it was unobtrusive
and did not drive the jurors in a particular direction. Although this line of
research is still in its infancy, it is extraordinarily promising and its lessons
could easily be transferred to the courtroom.
2. Aspects of the CivilJustice System that Favor Defendants
The General Theory of the Second Best instructs us that fixing some
imperfections in a system while others remain in operation can actually
produce a new situation that is worse than the old.191 Correcting biases that
favor plaintiffs without correcting biases that favor defendants could actually
make the situation worse, rather than better.
92
The civil justice system favors malpractice defendants in two important
respects. First, as discussed earlier, jurors sympathize with physicians and
distrust the motives of plaintiffs who sue them. 93 Second, malpractice
187. Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 163, at 94-98; see also Ronnie Janoff-Bulman et al.,
Cognitive Biases in Blaming the Victim, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161, 169-73
(finding that requesting subjects to explain a neutral outcome did not reduce victim blaming).
188. Kathryn Kadous, Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases, 18
CONTEMP. AcCT. REs. 425 (2001). This paper is based on data from her dissertation at the
University of Illinois.
189. Id. at 439. She found that negative outcome information did cause higher levels of
motivation to lay blame. Id She apparently did not attempt to measure affect directly, however.
190. Id. at 432.
191. See R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best 24 REv. ECON.
STUD. 11, 12-13 (1956-1957).
192. The neatness with which pro-defendant access bias offsets or corrects pro-plaintiff
process bias should not be overstated. Gillette and Krier appear to have assumed, for purposes
of simplifying their basic model, that the process and access biases would equally affect all risk
producers. If, however, the access bias (false negatives) were concentrated in one subset of
injurers (say, obstetricians) and the erroneous verdicts (the false positives) in another, then one
group of defendants (say, family physicians) could remain insulated from an adequate
deterrent signal while the compensating deterrent signal produced by pro-plaintiff process bias
would be concentrated on another subset of physicians.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 129-40.
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defendants benefit from the obstacles that victims face in bringing their
claims to court.
Most victims of medical negligence never make a claim. A California
study found only one claim for every ten negligently injured patients. 194 Even
more remarkably, only one in six of those who suffered major, permanent
injuries filed suit.1 5 A later New York study found only one claim for every
7.6 negligent injuries.196 Most recently, a study of hospital negligence in
Utah and Colorado had similar findings. 97 Under these circumstances, the
deterrent signal sent to injurers is likely to be tragically inadequate. 98
Advantages like these may offset the benefit, if any, conferred upon
plaintiffs by hindsight bias. According to The General Theory of the Second Best,
the elimination or reduction of one system of imperfection (such as
hindsight bias) will not necessarily improve overall allocative efficiency as
long as other imperfections (such as access bias) remain.19 Because two
imperfections can counteract each other, the reduction of one, but not the
other, can actually reduce efficiency. In tort litigation, therefore, the
defendant's fear of hindsight bias may partially offset the potential for
underdeterrence posed by access bias.
3. Concluding Thoughts About Hindsight Bias
Unfortunately, we know very little about the operation of hindsight bias
in actual litigation. Actual jury trials differ from experimental studies in
material respects that may reduce the presence of hindsight bias. In
addition, judges and attorneys have the power to reduce the likelihood of a
biased verdict. Studies designed to test this hypothesis have had mixed
results. However, social scientists have barely begun to explore the full array
of tools, ranging from voir dire to summation, that defense counsel and
defense witnesses can employ to shrink the hindsight bias. Nor have they
tested whether plaintiff's counsel can successfully employ tactics that will
preserve or even enhance hindsight bias. Many important questions,
therefore, remain unanswered. In the interim, it seems reasonable to
speculate that the trial process can reduce, but not eliminate, hindsight bias.
194. DANZON, supra note 4, at 19; Saks, supra note 141, at 1183 (citing CAL. MED. ASS'N &
CAL HosP. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILrry STUDY 101 (Don H. Mills
ed., 1977)).
195. Saks, supra note 141, at 1183.
196. WEILER ETAL, supra note 126, at 70 tbl.4.1.
197. See David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 254 (2000) (finding that only 3% of the patients who suffered
negligent injury filed suit).
198. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1027, 1044-45 (1990) (arguing that pro-plaintiff biases in the judicial process ("process bias")
may be outweighed by factors that limit access to the courts ("access bias")).
199. Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHL-
KENT L. REV. 3,3 (1998).
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Before deciding on measures to correct any residual hindsight bias,
courts also need to consider whether any advantage conferred upon
malpractice plaintiffs by uncorrected hindsight bias is offset by aspects of the
civil justice system that favor malpractice defendants. These factors include
juror skepticism toward malpractice plaintiffs and the barriers that exist to
bringing a lawsuit. It may not be fair to take significant measures to reduce
hindsight bias (such as deference to medical customs) without taking similar
measures to reduce the biases that benefit defendants.
E. POLYCENTRIC1TY
In an article entitled Process Constraints in Tort, Professor James
Henderson offered a quite different reason for retaining the custom-based
standard of care. 200 Building on the work of Lon Fuller, Henderson argued
that medical malpractice actions are "polycentric" and that resolving them
using a reasonable care test "would exceed the limits of adjudication." 0 '
1. The Problem Posed by Polycentric Disputes
Polycentric disputes are those that require the simultaneous "weighing
and balancing of interrelated ... considerations." 20 2 They raise issues that
cannot be resolved in a linear, step-by-step fashion and, instead, require
205simultaneous assessment of many choices. Building a bridge was an
example used by Lon Fuller:
204
There are rational principles for building bridges of structural
steel. But there is no rational principle which states, for example,
that the angle between girder A and girder B must always be 45
degrees. This depends on the bridge as a whole. One cannot
construct a bridge by conducting successive separate arguments
concerning the proper angle for every pair of intersecting girders.
One must deal with the whole structure.2 0 5
Fuller felt that questions about how to build a bridge were not well suited to
resolution by adjudication. Family disputes about where to go on vacation
200. James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 901 (1982)
[hereinafter Henderson, Process Constraints]; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 494 (1976) [hereinafter
Henderson, Retreat from the Rule of Law] (discussing the dangers of "independent judicial review
of medical custom"). Keeton also had made a brief mention of polycentricity in malpractice
disputes in 1979. Keeton, supra note 53, at 359.
201. Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 923-24.
202. Id. at 907.
203. See id. at 908-911 (using a hypothetical problem to illustrate the concept).
204. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404
(1978) (using multiple illustrations to explain polycentric decision making).
205. Id. at 403.
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provide another example of a polycentric dispute. 2 6 Fuller also believed that
disputes over the allocation of resources were polycentric. "Generally
speaking, it may be said that problems in the allocation of economic
resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for
adjudication."
20 7
Extending Fuller's reasoning, Henderson concluded that the tort
standard of reasonable care is so open-ended that it, too, is polycentric. 208 As
a result, he favored the retention of tort doctrines that make tort duties less
open-ended, such as the traditional status rules in landowner cases and
209judicial deference to custom in malpractice cases.
Malpractice disputes have an especially strong air of polycentricity when
they involve resource allocation issues. When a plaintiff contends that her
condition should have been treated more aggressively, for example, she is
suggesting that more resources should have been devoted to her care. Jurors
cannot make a wise decision about her claim to resources without some
sense of the implications that their decision will have for the allocation of
resources to other competing medical and social uses. In Henderson's view,
asking judges or juries to do this "clearly would exceed the limits of
adjudication."210
Deference to custom appealed to Henderson because it cured the
circularity of the underlying allocation decision. Instead of making an
allocation decision, the jury would have the more manageable task of
deciding "whether the conduct of the individual physician conformed to the
established standards of his profession."21 1 Although Henderson conceded
that a custom-based standard may not be the fairest test of culpability, he felt
that deference to custom is one of "[t]he concessions that substantive tort
law must make to the realities of process.2 12
206. See Henderson, Retreat from the Rule of Law, supra note 200, at 472 (imagining the
difficulties a court would face in resolving this issue).
207. Fuller, supra note 204, at 400. Imagine, for example, a dispute over how to allocate a
city's revenues.
208. See Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 922 (discussing the difficulties of
applying a reasonable standard of care); Henderson, Retreat from the Rule of Law, supra note 200,
at 478-79 (discussingjudicial approaches to dealing with problems of negligence).
209. See Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 923-25 (discussing alternative
approaches to determining liability). He also includes the no-duty-to-rescue rule. Id. at 928-43.
210. Id. at 923-24. Richard Pearson briefly made a similar point in 1976 in support of his
assertion that "[c]ourts are not well suited institutionally to the making of evaluations of
industry custom." Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. LJ.
528, 534 n.40 (1976).
211. Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 924. Courts can escape the problem
of polycentricity by delegating "the open-ended task of planning reasonable medical care" to
the "collective managerial authority of the medical profession." Henderson, Retreat from the Rule
of Law, supra note 200, at 480.
212. Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 902; accord CLARK C. HAVIGHURST Er
AL, HEALTH CARE LAw AND POuicY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 1010-13 (2d ed. 1998)
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Henderson is not alone in his pessimism about judicial efforts to make
health care allocation decisions. Writing about health care rationing
decisions in the context of health insurance contract interpretation, Mark
Hall has concluded that "the cost/benefit trade-offs . . . that underlie




The polycentricity argument in favor of a custom-based standard of care
turns on two fundamental assumptions. One is that medical customs will be
readily ascertainable, thus curing the problem of polycentricity without
producing equivalent problems of indeterminacy. In reality, however,
medical practices rarely provide the stable, ascertainable benchmark that
Henderson desired. As a result, Henderson himself has now concluded that
courts cannot rely on the presence of medical customs to serve as the basisS •• 214
for their decisions. The second assumption is that tort disputes-at least
those involving resource allocation issues-cannot be resolved by the jury in
a principled manner. That assumption is also questionable.
a. The Absence of Stable Customs
In the pasts few decades, medical researchers have learned that clinical
practices vary dramatically and inexplicably. A number of studies, starting
215with the classic work ofJohn Wennberg, have demonstrated that physician
practices vary widely, even within narrow geographic areas. In Vermont, for
example, eight percent of the people in one community had their tonsils
taken out while seventy percent of the residents of a different community
(noting that custom might be chosen as the legal benchmark for administrative reasons that do
not imply that customs are optimal or right). Henderson recommends that we "strive to
achieve... reasonable accommodations of substantive objectives within process constraints."
Hendeson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 948.
213. MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 72 (1997). In addition,
Havighurst, Blumstein, and Brennan, although not relying on the concept of polycentricity,
have suggested that reference to professional standards may be necessary to make the legal
standard of care manageable. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 212, at 1010-13 (suggesting
that reference to professional standards is necessary to make the legal standard of care
manageable in length and enforceable in court); CLARK C. HAVIGHURsT ET AL., HEALTH CARE
LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS, TEACHER'S MANUAL CHAPTER 7, 5 (1999)
("custom is probably the only feasible starting point."); id. at 7 ("It is very unlikely that the
courts, with their limited resources and dependence on lawyers and lay juries, can ever arrive at
and administer an efficient standard for governing all medical care.").
214. SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr. &John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice; 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1383 (1994)
(discussing the changing fare of health care litigation). As an alternative, he seems to advocate
an increased role for contractually-specified standards. Id. at 1404.
215. John Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Malpractice Variations: A Proposal for Action,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 7.
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had the surgery.216 In Iowa, the rate of prostate removal ranged from 15% to
60%.2l7 A Medicare study found that procedure rates varied by more than
three hundred percent for more than one-half of the procedures studied.218
In addition to the geographic variation that permeates clinical
medicine, the highly differentiated nature of medical problems is also a
barrier to the formation of medical customs. 219 Patients vary in ways that
resist standardization. 220 This variation is matched by a similar variety in
possible therapeutic responses, each with its own mix of benefits, risks, and
costs.2 2 1 At the same time, physicians vary in their preferences and in their
knowledge of medical literature and practices. 2 Finally, the movement of
many employers away from fee-for-service health plans and toward managed
care plans has produced significant differences among health plans in their
resources and their cost-containment philosophies.223  Under these
circumstances, there will rarely be a "custom" that provides a clear rule of
decision.
In theory, of course, the respectable minority rule of malpractice law
should solve this problem by eliminating the need to identify a single
professional norm. However, courts have not applied the respectable
minority rule in this fashion; instead, they give these cases to the jury. As
Mark Hall has noted, "[T]his breakdown between theory and practice
essentially allows the jury to impose, based on its own independent
judgment, the governing standard of care-the very result malpractice law
attempts to avoid." 224 In practice, therefore, the custom-based standard of
care routinely fails to provide an external benchmark to displace the jury's
independent determination of reasonability.
There is an additional erroneous assumption underlying the idea that a
custom-based standard will provide a more ascertainable and predictable
standard. In truth, few trial experts can be expected to have an accurate
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id.
218. CURRAN ETAL, supra note 41, at 36.
219. See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 214, at 1390 (noting the problems the
differential nature of medical problems pose in forming medical customs).
220. See HALL, supra note 213, at 84-88 (concluding that individual treatment decisions are
complex and individualized); Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 214, at 1390 (concluding that
the "highly differentiated nature of medical problems" is an obstacle to the formation of useful
medical customs); McCoid, supra note 4, at 584 (stating that "there is no standard patient").
221. Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 214, at 1390.
222. Id. at 1391.
223. See id. at 1399-400 (noting the heterogeneity of modem health plans); E. Haavi
Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. Prrr. L.
-REV. 1, 8-20, 94-95 (1997) (same).
224. Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 119, 128-29 (1991); see Peters, supra note 1, at 186 (noting the failure
of the respectable minority rule to keep these cases from the jury).
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sense of what most physicians are doing. As David Eddy notes, "[I]t is a
major research task to figure out what practitioners in a community are
doing." 225 As a consequence, experts who are asked questions about the
standard of care are unlikely to have a reliable understanding of customary
norms across the nation or even in similar communities. Instead, their
testimony is more likely to be a barometer of their own practices.
Recognizing that customs are illusory, Henderson has now retreated
from his undivided support for deference to custom. Instead, he and his
coauthor John Siliciano have recommended greater reliance on
226contractually-based standards of care. But that solution will only work if
the parties enter into an enforceable agreement governing the standard of
care. Absent such an agreement, the courts still must provide a default
standard of care. When courts choose this standard, they need to take into
account that the custom-based standard of care rarely lives up to its promise
of providing a bright-line rule of decision.
b. The Adjudicability of Negligence Actions
A second reason for doubting the polycentricity argument is that it
proves too much. As Henderson uses the term, all tort actions decided
227under a "reasonable care" standard are polycentric. Yet, juries routinely
make competent decisions in these cases. The empiricists who study jury
decision-making regularly and convincingly reassure us of this.
8
The manner in which most negligence cases are pleaded and proven
may explain why tort actions are more manageable than critics anticipated.
Plaintiffs typically narrow the scope of the jury's inquiry by focusing upon an
"untaken precaution" and alleging that a reasonable person would have
undertaken it.2 29 With the task so confined, the jury need not determine the
precise combination of safety precautions that would optimize social
230welfare. Instead, jurors examine the defendant's failure to take the
specific precaution recommended by the plaintiff. This focus on specific
untaken precautions narrows the jury's assignment and, thus, removes its
ostensibly polycentric parameters.
225. David M. Eddy, The Use of Evidence and Cost Effectiveness by the Courts: How Can It Help
Improve Health Care?, 26J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y& L. 387,396 (2001).
226. See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 214, at 1391 (noting that variations in practice
destroy much of custom's potential for clarity and simplicity).
227. See Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 923-24 (suggesting that juries
cope with these simpler cases by relying on empathy and intuition).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 61-81 (reviewing studies ofjury verdicts).
229. Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
230. Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 229, at 147. In addition, most medically adverse
events occurring during hospitalization involve surgery or adverse drug events. Eric J. Thomas
et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE
261, 268 (2000). These mishaps are likely to involve a lack of skill rather than a faulty allocation
of scarce resources.
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In some jurisdictions, the jury's task will be structured even further by a
jury instruction explaining that reasonability is determined by balancing the
risks of the defendant's conduct against its utility.231 So confined, a
negligence action differs materially from open-ended disputes.
Of course, these solutions to the problem of polycentricity do not
guarantee that the jury will reach sound conclusions. The jury may, for
example, be influenced by hindsight, be confused by the evidence, or give
too little weight to the cost implications of its decision. Those, however, are
different objections which have been evaluated above.
To summarize, the polycentricity argument for taking the responsibility
of standard-setting away from the jury is vulnerable to two important
criticisms. First, it overestimates the extent to which malpractice actions and
other tort actions are open-ended. Second, it seeks to cure the problem of
polycentricity by relying on an external benchmark-customary medical
standards-that itself is often indeterminate.
F. EVALUATINGDOUBTSABOUTTIEJURY
Juries and judges usually agree. So do juries and physicians. Together,
these findings strongly rebut the widely-shared misconception that juries are
biased in favor of injured patients. They also provide a credible basis for
concluding that juries understand the evidence in tort cases in general and
in malpractice actions in particular. Although social scientists have found
that lay people are prone to certain errors using statistical proof, they have
also found that these tendencies are correctable.
However, jurors may be vulnerable to hindsight bias. We do not know
whether the trial process can neutralize this danger. In addition, jurors may
be resistant to the explicit balancing of cost against safety. If so, they may
penalize responsible cost-control in health care delivery. At present,
however, we can only speculate about this risk as the scant research data is
conflicting. Furthermore, it is quite possible that any advantage conferred
upon plaintiffs by these tendencies is offset both by the sympathy that jurors
have for physicians and by the barriers to litigation that favor defendants.
Overall, the jury receives a good but not perfect report card. However,
none of the credible doubts expressed about jury competence are unique to
medical malpractice litigation.2 32 Hindsight bias and resistance to risk-utility
calculus are threats to all tort litigation. The same can be said for worries
about complexity. In modem jury trials, complexity abounds. Product
liability actions, toxic tort cases, airplane accidents, and highway design cases
231. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting
that reasonableness requires a balancing of risk and utility); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 291 (1975) (same).
232. See, e.g.,John KimbroughJohnson, Jr., An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard
of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 743 (1970) (pointing out that these concerns are applicable to all
negligence actions); Silver, supra note 4, at 1217 (same).
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are just a few of the tort actions in which juries listen to experts and then
determine whether the defendant has behaved like a reasonable person with
similar training. Only in professional malpractice actions have courts taken
the task of setting the legal standard of care away from the jury and given it
to the regulated industry. As a result, the case for taking standard setting
away from the jury in malpractice actions seems to turn on something
special about medical or professional negligence actions.
In malpractice actions, it seems likely that professionals benefit from
judicial confidence that their customs provide a reliable barometer of
reasonable behavior. This confidence is not reposed in the customs of other
industries, such as trucking or product manufacturing. It has two likely
explanations: (1) faith in the professionalism of physicians, and (2) faith in
the discipline of the medical market. Each of these possibilities is explored
further in Part III
III. CONFIDENCE IN MEDICAL CUSTOMS
Scholars and courts have articulated two quite distinct rationales for
trusting clinical practices. The first is faith in the professionalism of
physicians. The second is faith in the power of the market to make medical
practices efficient. In the real world, however, medical practices live up to
neither ideal.
A. FAITHINPHYSICIANS
Historically, both courts and scholars have trusted physicians to put the
welfare of patients above all other interests.
1. A History of Trust
Faith in physicians resonates throughout the early legal commentary
explaining the customary standard of care. Allan McCoid's classic 1959
article on the medical standard of care contended that physicians "should be
free to operate in the best interests of the patient. "233 Post-hoc judicial
supervision, he feared, would interfere with that freedom and prevent
doctors from practicing sound medicine. 2 34 Richard Pearson summarized
the underlying logic of the custom-based standard of care as follows: "There
is no need for courts to act as a source of pressure to compel the medical
profession to give adequate consideration to patient safety and well-being,
since the forces that operate within the medical profession make such extra-
233. McCoid, supra note 4, at 608.
234. Id. at 608. In an earlier piece, McCoid had concluded "that the doctor is exercising his
skill for the benefit of the patient [and] inasmuch as this assumption is a basic tenet of medical
science it seems a proper one." Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv. 381, 431-32 (1957).
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professional pressure unnecessary. "235 Dean Prosser, too, believed that the
custom-based standard of care rested on "the healthy respect which the
courts have had for the learning of a fellow profession, and their reluctance
to overburden it with liability based on uneducated judgment."23 6 Another
scholar, James Henderson, concluded that "[an important reason for
allowing the medical profession to set its own standards is that courts can
assume these standards are adequate to protect the interests of patients."237
Even today, courts retaining a custom-based standard of care emphasize
their respect for their fellow professionals. "[W]e defer," said the South
238Carolina Supreme Court, "to the collective wisdom" of physicians.
Likewise, the Kansas Supreme Court based its ruling on its faith in "the
medical profession's own recognition of its obligations to maintain its
standards."2 9
The most interesting statement of this rationale appears in a 1985
Arizona products liability decision. In Rossel v. Volkswagen of America,240
Volkswagen contended that its automobile designers were professionals, like
physicians, and that their conduct should therefore be judged against
professional customs. Unpersuaded, the Arizona Supreme Court explained
that it would delegate its standard-setting power "only when the nature of
the group and its special relationship with its clients assure society that those
standards will be set with primary regard to protection of the public rather than to
such considerations as increased profitability."
241
2. The Limits of Professionalism
Regrettably, much of this confidence in physician norms is misplaced.
Recent research demonstrates that physicians, like the rest of us, are driven
not only by science and fidelity to patient interests, but also by habit, self-
interest, and other competing considerations. In the understated words of
Clarence Morris, "doctors as a class may be more likely to exert their best
efforts than drovers, railroads, and merchants; but they are human and
subject to temptations of laziness and unthinking acceptance of
traditions."24
235. Pearson, supra note 210, at 537.
236. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 32, at 189.
237. Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 200, at 926.
238. Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989).
239. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (Kan. 1960).
240. 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985).
241. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). Physicians did not always enjoy this special trust. One
hundred and fifty years ago, physicians enjoyed neither exalted social status nor legal privilege.
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 81-92 (1982) (providing
a historical analysis of physicians' status and privileges). In tort law, they were held to the same
standard of reasonable care applied in other negligence actions. See Silver, supra note 4, at 1205-
11.
242. MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 4, at 56.
HeinOnline  -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 951 2001-2002
87 IOWA LAWREVIEW
Realistic skepticism about physician loyalty is consistent with the
findings of researchers who have studied physician self-referral practices.
They have learned that a physician is far more likely to order a procedure
like a lab test or x-ray if the physician owns the facility that will perform the
243procedure. In his important review of the literature on physician practices,
Timothy Jost reported that physician referral practice "is less influenced by
evaluations of technical competence than it is by factors such as affability of
the consultant, patient preferences, previous use of the consultant by the
referring physician, personal familiarity with the consultant, reciprocal




Cardiologists who do invasive procedures are much more likely to
recommend these procedures than primary care physicians and cardiologists
245
who do not perform these procedures. Physicians who have been coddled
by pharmaceutical sales representatives are more likely to prescribe the
246drugs made by that company. Physicians are professionals, but they are
also humans with their own financial and professional interests. As a
consequence, they are imperfect agents.2
4 7
In addition, surprisingly few clinical practices are actually based on
scientific evidence.248  In fact, current research provides definitive
243. See RICHARD P. KUSSEROW, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 18
(1989) (documenting the higher incidence of treatment for patients that are self-referred).
That practice was tolerated by the profession until Congress intervened. See Thomas L.
Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does it Take to Fix the Health Care System?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1825,
1831 (1997) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? (1997)).
244. Timothy S. Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health
Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525, 570 (1988); see HALL, supra note 213, at 46 (listing factors that lead
physicians to make decisions that fully informed patients would not make); Henderson &
Siliciano, supra note 214, at 1394 n.44 (noting that "professional pride and competition will
cause some physicians to use new, cutting edge technologies to treat conditions that are
amenable to less exotic interventions").
245. See John X. Ayanian et al., Rating the Appropriateness of Coronary Angiography--Do
Practicing Physicians Agree with an Expert Panel and with Each Other?, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1896,
1901 (1998) (finding that beliefs about appropriateness of coronary angiography varied by
groups).
246. See Jost, supra note 244, at 571; cf, E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE
ACCOUNTABLE: LAw AND THE NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE 71 (2001) (describing physician
susceptibility to drug advertisements).
247. See DANZON, supra note 4, at 221 (noting the imperfection).
248. See E. HAAvI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW
ECONOMIC 51 (1995) (stating that customs are sometimes based on "habit, hunch, current
fashion, and the profession's folk wisdom"); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When
Health Care Is Medically Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 231 (1999) ("Much of medical
practice is the result of tradition and collective experience. Many basic medieval interventions
have not been studied rigorously.").
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information about only a small percentage of all clinical decisions.249 And
when clinical evidence is available, physicians often are slow to act upon it.
In 1980, for example, a major study established that rigorous glucose control
significantly reduced long-term complications from diabetes.250 Yet, a study
of clinical practices in 1995 discovered that only one out of four diabetic
patients was receiving the recommended number of annual tests.2a1 That
finding was not aberrant. 2  Physicians commonly fail to follow the
guidelines recommended by their professional organizations.Z
As Haavi Morreim observes, clinical "routines are based not just on
clear data and careful reasoning, but also on habit, hunch, current fashion,
and the profession's folk wisdom."2 4 As a result, medical customs have a
veneer of scientific validity that is too often undeserved. This conclusion was
confirmed by the recent findings of the National Institutes of Health, which
concluded that tens of thousands of Americans lose their lives every year due
to medical error.25 5 As a result, Lawrence Gostin, a respected law professor
and policy analyst, summarizes the disappointing state of health care quality
this way:
The quality of health care is, by most accounts, a serious problem.
Research has demonstrated that physicians overuse health care
services by employing unnecessary interventions that are costly and
place patients at risk; underuse services by failing to afford
standard care that would produce favorable outcomes; and misuse
services by devising the wrong treatment plan or improperly
executing the correct plan.5 6
Medicine has also undergone a recent structural transformation that
249. See M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Care and the Enigma of Efficiency 166, 174 (1999),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractLid=184275.
250. DCCr Research Group, The Absence of Glycemic Threshold for the Development of Long-Term
Complication: The Perspective of the Diabetes Control and Complications Tia 38 DIABETES 1289
(1989).
251. See Lee N. Newcomer, Physician, Measure Thyself, HEALTH AFF., Jul-Aug. 1998 at 32, 33.
Another example of belated response is provided by the widespread failure of physicians to use
beta-blockers to prevent recurrence of myocardial infarctions. Even though the American
College of Cardiology had adopted a guideline recommending the administration of beta-
blockers, two studies found that roughly half of the eligible patients were not receiving the
treatment. See id. (reviewing the studies).
252. See MORREIM, supra note 248, at 70 (reviewing the findings of the failure to follow
practices widely agreed to be appropriate).
253. See Mello, supra note 32, at 680-82 (discussing the incomplete compliance).
254. MORREIM, supra note 248, at 51.
255. See COMM. ON QuALrlY OF HEALTH CARE iN AM., INsT. OF MED., To ERR is HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 2 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999).
256. Lawrence 0. Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical Malpractice as a
Barrier, 282JAMA 1742-43 (2000).
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accentuates the danger that patient interests will suffer. 57 Control of the
insurance market has shifted from not-for-profit insurers like Blue Cross &
Blue Shield to profit-oriented commercial insurers. These insurers are using
a variety of strategies to make physicians more cost-conscious and responsive
to plan preferences, including proprietary treatment guidelines, financial
incentives for reducing utilization, and the threat of termination without
cause (politely called "deselection") .25 Understandably, commentators fear
that the loyalty of physicians is now divided between their patients and their
2,59plans.
Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to revisit the
assumption that medical customs are uniquely reliable. The unwavering
faith that the law once placed in physicians was probably naive from the
outset and predictably has weakened in a more realistic and cynical age. In
the words of noted physician and policy analyst David Eddy,
[G] iven the very high rates of inappropriate care that can prevail in
communities, if we actually measured what practitioners were
doing and used that to define the standard of care, we would run a
high risk of installing an inappropriate practice as the standard of
care. The well-documented overuses of hysterectomies, antibiotics,
260bypasses, and C-sections are examples.
In the real world, physicians are not immune from conflicting interests.
In addition, health care delivery is increasingly controlled by for-profit
organizations concerned more with cost than with quality. As a
consequence, it is far less obvious than it once was that medicine should set
its own standard of care.
B. MARKET DSClPLINW
The second justification offered for trusting customs is an economic
one. Scholars like Judge Richard Posner, Patricia Danzon, and Richard
Epstein have argued that customary practices are a good proxy for
reasonable care because the marketplace will force medical practices to be
257. Between 1988 and 1994, membership in nonprofit HMOs increased by 24.9% while
membership in for-profit HMOs increased by 91.6%. SeeJon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have
Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 134, 135; see also Daniel M. Fox, The
Politics of Explicit Rationing, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 279, 280 (noting that consumers are
"increasingly aware that their relationship with physicians has business as well as fiduciary
aspects"). By 1997, most HMO members were enrolled in for-profit plans. Gabel, supra at135.
258. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 286, 298-300 (1999) (discussing how physicians may not refer
patients for "ancillary services" and HMOs restrict patient care through economic disincentives
for physicians).
259. See Michael H. Bailit, Ominous Signs and Portents: A Purchaser's View of Health Care Market
Trends, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 85, 86 (discussing how compensation systems do not
adequately take into account physician's ethics).
260. Eddy, supra note 225, at 396.
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Under traditional economic theory, customs ought to be efficient
whenever transaction costs are low. 262 If transaction costs are low, sellers, like
physicians, have an incentive independent of tort law to provide the level of
263care for which their customers are willing to pay. Transaction costs tend to
be low whenever injurers and victims have a preexisting contractual
relationship through which they can negotiate their respective obligations.
Under these circumstances, law and economics scholars reason that the
market will produce efficient customs. 264 Because the relationship between
patients and physicians appears to satisfy these requirements, several
scholars have concluded that physicians will adopt customs that reflect the
level of safety precautions desired by the public.
However, this conclusion assumes that the market for medical services is
substantially free of market imperfections such as information and
bargaining power asymmetries. 2r That assumption is unrealistic. There are
several reasons why market forces cannot ensure that customary practices
are economically ideal.
First, consumers lack sufficient choice to manifest their preferences.
Most individuals obtain insurance from their employers. In 1996, employees
in 80% of the small businesses offering health benefits did not have any
choice of health plan.6 Managed care plans, in turn, limit the employee's
choice of physician, and then influence the physician's options and
incentives. As a result, patients lack the choices necessary to insure that
medical practices reflect their preferences.
Second, to the extent that patients have a choice, they lack the medical
training necessary to evaluate alternative treatments and providers.267 In fact,
261. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 168-69 (4th ed. 1992); see DANZON,
supra note 4, at 141 (arguing for a customary standard); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice
Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 201, 203-05 (1986) (advocating customary standards if the contract sets no other one).
262. See WILUAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 132 (1987); POSNER, supra note 261, at 168.
263. SeePOSNER, supra note 261, at 168-69.
264. SeeDONDExEESETAL, EXPLORINGTHEDOMAINOFACCIDENTLAw96 (1996); POSNER,
supra note 261, at 168; RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMICANALYSIs 673 (1982).
265. See Rachlinski, supra note 162, at 611 (stating that an efficient custom must not have
market imperfections like lack of information or bargaining power).
266. Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Emploers and Their Health Benefits, 1988-1996: An Awkward
Adolescence, HEALTH AFF., Sept-Oct. 1997, at 103, 105. Nearly half of all Americans have no
choice of plan. Norman Daniels & James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 50, 54; Lynn Etheredge et al., What is Driving Health
System Change?, Health Aff., Winter 1996, at 93,94 (stating that 48% of employees only have one
plan).
267. See Greaney, supra note 243, at 1834 (discussing the inability of consumers to
successfully evaluate health care quality); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating
Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM.J.L. & MED. 7, 14-15 (2000) (same).
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they may not even be able to evaluate the quality of treatments they have
actually received. 2"8 Third, even if they had the education and sophistication
to manage complex medical information, too little outcome data is available
for patients to pick either providers or medical plans based on quality.26 9 In
fact, physicians and health plans aggressively resist consumer access to this
data.270 And unlike consumers of food and clothing, most consumers of
medical care are not repeat purchasers27' and cannot learn by trial and error
about cost-quality trade-offs. 2 Finally, patients make many of their medical
consumption decisions under stressful and emotionally charged conditions
inconsistent with informed reflection.
273
Researchers have found that hundreds of thousands of Americans
consent to unnecessary medical procedures annually. 274 Other studies have
found that patients who fund their own care make poor medical choices,
cutting back equally on both effective and ineffective care. 75 Preliminary
reports also indicate that consumers do not use health care "report cards"
because the information is too complex.
6
268. SeeJost, supra note 244, at 560 (discussing the inability of consumers to successfully
evaluate health care quality). Much health care, therefore, qualifies as a "credence good" for
which the consumer must ultimately trust the provider. Id.
269. See DANZON, supra note 4, at 110 (noting scarcity of data); Greaney, supra note 243, at
1833-34 (same); Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1392 (same).
270. See Ellyn E. Spragins, What Are They Hiding? HMOs Are Getting More Secretive About
Quality, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1999, at 74 (discussing resistance to consumer access to data).
271. See DANZON, supra note 4, at 141 (discussing the nature of medical care); HALL, supra
note 213, at 45 (1997) (describing procedures like bypass and cancer surgery).
272. HALL, supra note 213, at 45.
273. See Greaney, supra note 243, at 1837; Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1392.
274. SYLVIA LAxv & STEVE POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 18-19, 61-
62, 251-52 (1978); Mark R. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in
the Use of Health Care Services?, 258JAMA 2533, 2536 (1987).
275. See HALL, supra note 213, at 49 (reviewing the literature). Absent an efficient market,
the customary practices of an industry are likely to favor the interests of that industry and to
discount the interests of the people it puts at risk. POSNER, supra note 261, at 168.
276. SeeJudith H. Hibbard et al., Informing ConsumerDecisions in Health Care: Implications from
Decision-Making Research, 75 MILBANK Q. 395, 412 (1997) (finding that more than half of the
Medicare population has difficulty using comparative health plan information); Stephen T.
Mennemeyer et al., Death and Reputation: How Consumers Acted Upon HCFA Mortality Information,
34 INQUIRY 117, 118-19, 125-26 (1997); see alsoJames A. Schuttinga et al., Health Plan Selection in
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 10 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 119, 132, 134 (1985)
(discussing complexity of choosing health care and health care plans). Even though pregnant
women constitute a group of patients believed to be highly motivated to search for providers on
the basis of quality, a recent study found that they rarely do so. See ThomasJ. Hoerger & Leslie
Z. Howard, Search Behavior and Choice of Physician in the Market for Prenatal Care, 33 MED. CARE
332, 333, 341, 348 (1995). In Pennsylvania, researchers studying consumer report cards
concluded that "public reporting of mortality outcomes in Pennsylvania has had virtually no
direct impact on patients' selection of hospitals or surgeons." Eric Schneider & Arnold Epstein,
Use of Public Performance Reports: A Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 JAMA 1638,
1642 (1998).
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Patients clearly need assistance policing the market. Unassisted, they
simply cannot accurately monitor the quality of many of the medical services
that they receive. As Mark Hall correctly observes, it is "not feasible to expect
a viable consumer-driven market to develop for discrete treatment
decisions."277 These market flaws are likely to favor providers at the expense
of patients. In the words of one commentator, " [ W]hen quality is hard to
measure, there are many ways to increase return on equity by lowering
quality."278 In an imperfect market, patients are likely to receive less quality
and more risk than they would have been willing to purchase if fully
informed and able to choose. 9
Because of these barriers to intelligent choice, patients typically rely on
280the judgment of their physicians. Yet, as explained above, physicians are
imperfect agents. They are vulnerable to an array of conflicting interests.
281
TimJost describes the prescribing and admitting practices of physicians this
way:
Physicians prescribing a particular drug are often responding more
to the fawning solicitations of pharmaceutical company detail men
or to the demands of their patients than to their own experience
with the pharmaceutical. A doctor may admit a patient to a
particular hospital because it is the only hospital that will give him
staff privileges, or because it is most convenient to his office, rather
than because it is the hospital most suited to the patient's
needs .... Whatever the doctor's motives may be for a particular
referral or lack of referral, the patient is, for all the reasons already
given, seldom in a position independently to evaluate that
judgment, or even its results .... Because consumers lack reliable
sources of information, the market cannot be counted on to assure
qaiy282
quality. 2
As an alternative, employers could conceivably act as fiduciaries for
283their employees. However, their primary interest is cost, not quality.
277. HALL, supra note 213, at 46.
278. R Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Finandal ncentives on Quality of Care, 76 MILBANK
Q. 649,655 (1998).
279. SeeDANZON, supra note 4, at 221.
280. See Greaney, supra note 243 (noting this reliance); HALL, supra note 213, at 45 (same);
Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 4, at 1392 & n.38 (same).
281. Supra text accompanying notes 242-60.
282. Jost, supra note 244, at571.
283. See id. at 576; Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be
on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1333, 1369 (1994). As a
consequence, plans compete on cost rather than quality. See also Mark A. Hall, The Competitive
Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 685, 685 (1999)
(reporting that small group health insurers compete on the basis of risk selection rather than
quality of care). Few large employers reward high quality plans with more business. See Bailit,
supra note 259, at 87.
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Moreover, they too lack the capacity for gathering and evaluating
information about the quality of various providers.284 Furthermore, they
could not feasibly supervise all of the individual treatment decisions
affecting their employees. As a consequence, they cannot insure that clinical
medical practices adequately reflect the interests and preferences of their
employees.
C. SIZING UP MEDICAL NORMS
Regrettably, much of the confidence that courts have placed in
physician norms is misplaced. As Clark Havighurst notes, medical custom is
"almost certainly a poor guide to efficiency in medical practice.
Physicians are influenced not only by scientific advances and concern for
patient welfare, but also by habit, self-interest, and other competing
considerations. As a consequence, medical customs differ widely and
inexplicably from one location to another. Indeed, many academics have
286
concluded that the search for customs is illusory. In addition, health care
delivery is increasingly controlled by for-profit organizations which may
weigh cost more heavily than quality. Under these circumstances, courts can
no longer assume that medical customs are a reliable barometer of
reasonable care.
IV. THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OFJURY STANDARD-SETYING
Jury decision-making is imperfect. So, too, are medical customs. If the
choice between deferring to physicians and relying on juries had to be made
exclusively on this basis, the choice would be difficult and highly speculative.
However, there are important policy reasons for resolving this uncertainty in
favor of the jury.
A. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Under a custom-based standard, said one court, "the profession itself
would be permitted to set the measure of its own legal liability, even though
that measure might be far below a level of care readily attainable.... 2 87
"Negligence," said another, "cannot be excused on the grounds that others
practice the same kind of negligence. "2ss The unstated conclusion in these
opinions is that deference to customary standards would place the
284. See Jost, supra note 244, at 567-68 (noting the cost and the freerider problems
associated with this task).
285. HAVIGHURSTETAL., supra note 213, at 5.
286. E.g., Keeton, supra note 53, at 365, 368; Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 214, at
1390.
287. United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992), aft'd, 827 P.2d 509
(Colo. 1992) (noting that courts, not professions, decide due care); Darling v. Charleston Cmty.
Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (same).
288. Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981).
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profession above the law. By contrast, the reasonable physician test assigns
the task of standard-setting to the jury-citizens chosen by the courts to
represent the community.
289
B. INCORPORATING COMMUNITY VALuEs
The reasonable physician standard will allow the jury, as a
representative of the community, to apply community standards to the
determination of liability. Juries make a crucial value judgment when they
decide whether a defendant has met the standard of reasonable care. To
decide, for example, whether an automobile manufacturer should have
spent more money to reduce the risk of fatality in frontal collisions, jurors
must place a value on the preservation of life and on the avoidance of
personal injury. In malpractice cases, it seems reasonable to assume that a
citizen jury will reflect community values better than physicians and
insurance executives.2 ° Making this value judgment is a quintessential jury
function. It is assigned to them because their value judgment is likely to
parallel the values of the community. It is no coincidence that both state and
federal constitutions guarantee the right to a trial by jury.291 The assignment
of standard-setting power to the jury gives substance to that right.292 The
burden of persuasion certainly rests on those who would take this power
away from the jury.
C. ENCOURAGNGITNOVATIONAAND QUA 1TYIMPROVRMENT
The custom-based standard, while providing immunity to physicians
who continue to adhere to obsolete customs, exposes innovators to
289. See; e.g.,JEFFREYABRAMSON, WE, THEJURY2-13 (1994) (making a thoughtful defense of
the jury as an institution of deliberative democracy); Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black,
65 YALE LJ. 482, 483 (1956) ("It offers an assurance ofjudgment by neighbors who understand
the community climate of values ... ."); see also Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective
Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2386-90 (1990)
(articulating a theory of negligence law in which the jury is crucial). P.S. Atiyah attributes the
large responsibility given to U.S. juries to distrust of central power, fear of rule by elites, and
anti-statism. P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987
DuKE LJ. 1002, 1017-18, 1043-44.
290. Researchers have found that lay people give weight to factors that are not taken into
account by risk experts, such as perceived control over the risk, the potential for catastrophe,
likelihood of fatality, inequitable distribution of the risk and benefits and the extent to which
the activity generates "unknown risks." See Cecil et a., supra note 90, at 762.
291. See Mark Curriden, Putting the Squeeze onjuries, ABAJ., Aug. 2000, at 52, 54.
292. Ideally, of course, elected legislatures would make decisions about fundamental and
recurrent policy choices. Occasionally, they do. However, neither legislatures nor administrative
agencies could hope to fashion ex ante rules of decision for even a tiny fraction of the many
treatment disputes that arise every day. The civil justice system is expected to perform this task.
Absent guidance from the legislatures, courts must decide whether the standard for these
disputes will be set by physicians or juries. Jury verdicts are more likely to reflect community
values and in this sense are the democratic choice.
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liability.291 It is safer to stay with the pack than to keep up with best practices.
The reasonable physician test escapes this shortcoming. "A emphasis on
reasonable rather than customary practices... insures that custom will not
shelter physicians who fail to adopt advances in their respective fields
294
D. HONE Y
The reasonable physician standard is also more honest. In jurisdictions
that purport to employ a custom-based standard of care, courts routinely
allow plaintiffs to reach the jury without proof that the defendant departed
from customary practice.295 Their doing so is inevitable. Custom could not
hope to provide an ex ante standard of care for every medical decision
required by the literally limitless variety of patients and their
296presentations.
Similarly, courts often allow parties to introduce evidence of clinical
practice guidelines even though these standards typically are not meant to
297describe customary practices. Instead, they are intended to raise the level
298
of existing practice. judges understandably admit these guidelines because
they believe authoritative standards are relevant. Yet, courts which accede to
these realities are effectively abandoning the custom-based standard of care
without admitting it. Formal adoption of the reasonable physician standard
of care would end this charade.
E. FREEDOM TO TAKE COSTS INTO ACCOUNT
Under the custom-based standard of care, many physicians feel obliged
to offer costly treatments or tests that confer little or no proven benefit
simply because their colleagues do.2 99 The reasonable physician test would
free physicians to abandon costly practices produced by habit, ignorance, or
293. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 212, at 1014-15 (noting this effect). An exception
exists for formal clinical trials in which the patient expressly consents to participation in an
experiment treatment. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974) (involving a
clinical trial); FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 206 (describing the exception).
294. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996).
295. See Peters, supra note 1, at 185-87 (demonstrating that many "customs-based"
jurisdictions also allow experts to evaluate the reasonableness of care given).
296. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 137 (1999) (noting that custom is not fine-
grained). Although a potential disadvantage of this individualization is the loss of guidance and
predictability that ex ante rules, like industry custom, could theoretically provide, the custom-
based standard of care simply does not provide the predictability that it promises. See supra text
accompanying notes 215-26 (noting that geographic variation and the difference in medical
problems prevents medical custom formation).
297. See Mello, supra note 32, at 677-84 (arguing that the guidelines are often not intended
to reflect current clinical practice).
298. Id.
299. I have heard this complaint in many conversations with physicians at our teaching
hospital.
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fee-for-service reimbursement.3 0 And it would permit their attorneys to offer
evidence that supports their conclusions about lack of effectiveness and cost.
Custom would not govern. Whether juries will be receptive to these
departures from custom, especially if costs played a major role in the
decision, is not yet known.
F. POLtCNG MANAGED CARE
Ajury-determined reasonability standard would permit the courts to set
a floor below which cost-cutting practices could not fall."'1 Both health
policy analysts and the public worry that managed care organizations place
too much emphasis on cost and too little emphasis on effectiveness. 302 For
reasons discussed above, 3 3 market forces alone are unlikely to insure a
reasonable trade-off between cost and quality. When quality is hard to
measure, companies have an incentive to cut quality unduly in order to
increase profits. The result could be a race to the bottom. A custom-based
standard would permit this race as long as other health plans and their
providers were responding to the market in a similar fashion. A reasonability
standard would not.
Because "physicians' decisions control 75% of health care spending,"3 4
health plans know that they must enlist the physicians' help to control
health care costs.3°5 Thus, they are paying physicians in a way that penalizes a
physician's use of expensive services like diagnostic tests, referrals to
306
specialists, and hospital admissions. Some plans are developing their own
proprietary treatment protocols in order to shape physician behavior at the
bedside.30 7 In addition, many plans have purchased software that permits
300. Courts allow risk-utility evidence in cases governed by a reasonable care standard. See,
e.g., Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 927 P.2d 240, 248 (Wash. 1997); Stephen G. Gilles, The Invdsible
Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015,1024 n.23 (1994).
301. Courts have not yet decided whether this standard of care can be modified by
contractual agreement. For a thoughtful discussion of the role of contract, see generally CLARK
C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHoicEs (1995) and MoRREIM, supra note 248.
302. See, e.g., Balit, supra note 259, at 86-87; Mark A. Hall, supra note 283, at 704 (1999);
Havighurst, supra note 267, at 8-9, 13, 26 (noting that "corporate health plans have assumed
extensive responsibility for the cost of care, without accepting more than nominal responsibility
for its quality").
303. See supra text accompanying notes 261-84 (stating that due to market imperfections,
economic forces alone cannot be relied on in making medical practices efficient).
304. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Managed Care: Six
Safeguards, 23J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 635, 635 (1998).
305. See Schwartz, supra note 147, at 1364 (describing the methods in which HMOs
persuade doctors to control costs, including paying them "on a 'capitation' basis" or adjusting
their annual salaries if their costs rise above a certain level).
306. See id. at 1364-65 (same).
307. See MORREIM, supra note 248, at 19-20 (describing the efforts to draft managed care
guidelines).
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308them to monitor the costs generated by each physician. Because
physicians depend upon plan participation for their access to patients, the
threat of termination provides the plan with powerful leverage over
physician behavior.0 9
These efforts to place physicians at risk make the threat of
undertreatment both more pervasive and more insidious. The threat of
undertreatment is more pervasive because the risk of improper denial of
care is no longer limited to the prospective utilization process; instead this
risk of denial affects every decision physicians make about a patient's
treatment. It is more insidious because bedside rationing by physicians is far
less apparent to patients than an insurer's utilization review denial.310 This
invisibility is, of course, part of bedside rationing's appeal to health plans. In
fact, United Healthcare has dropped its prospective utilization process for
physical illnesses entirely, preferring instead to rely on rationing by its
physicians."
The impact of these incentives on physicians is real. Gary Schwartz
recounts the experience of one medical group that was concerned about the
impact of these financial incentives on its income. Said one of the
physicians, "[W]e don't get paid if we go over budget."312 The group held
discussions to develop informal norms to keep costs down. Examples of the
resulting norms included prescribing Prozac to depressed patients for six
weeks before seriously considering a psychiatric consult and dissuading
women under fifty from having mammography.1 3 The reasonable physician
standard of care allows courts to monitor such practices.
Perhaps an even better strategy would be for states to regulate the
policies and payment practices of managed care organizations directly.
However, ERISA places serious barriers on the use of tort law or other state
laws to do so. 14 As a result, courts must settle for supervising the impact of
308. SeeJohn J. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven
Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 771 (1997) (describing various programs enabling
them to evaluate costs).
309. Finally, health plans typically reserve the contractual right to "deselect" plan physicians
without cause. See Schwartz, supra note 147, at 1363 (noting that physicians who order too many
tests may be "purged" from the preferred provider organization).
310. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Moral Imperatives Versus Market Solutions: Is Health Care a
Right?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 360 (1998) (calling it "hidden" rationing); Havighurst, supra note
267, at 12 (calling it "secret" rationing).
311. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel & Robert M. Arnold, The Unbearable Rightness of Bedside Rationing.
Physician Duties in a Climate of Cost Containment, 155 ARCHIVE OF INTERNAL MED. 1837, 1841
(1995) (noting that it is easier for plans not to ration themselves and to delegate this task to
physicians).
312. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 1365.
313. Id.
314. See Pegrarn v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000) (holding that employee benefit plans
may reward providers for limiting medical care without violating ERISA).
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these managed care policies at the bedside.
3 15
Of course, asking juries to supervise managed care norms presents an
obvious risk. Juries may resent health care decision-making that takes cost
into account. In that event, jury verdicts could undermine progress on cost-
control and push providers back toward the "spare no expense" habits of
fee-for-service medicine. At present, we do not have the data needed to
quantify this risk.
Does managed care pose a sufficient threat to patient welfare to warrant
the unquantifiable risk that juries will penalize reasonable cost-
consciousness? The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the available data
does not substantiate fears that managed care results in a lower quality of
care for the general public. Studies comparing HMO outcomes with fee-for-
service outcomes have found that HMO outcomes are better in some
circumstances, worse in others, and roughly equivalent overall." 6
On the other hand, there are several important reasons to view these
preliminary findings with some skepticism. First, most studies have found
that HMOs do have worse outcomes for high-risk groups, such as the
seriously ill, the poor, and the mentally ill.3 17 Second, the studies have
focused on relatively narrow measures of quality and were not designed to
rule out types of harm that were not measured.1 8 Third, the existing
literature largely relies on data that predates several important changes in
the managed care industry.
The recent changes are particularly troubling. For example, the two
major literature reviews undertaken by Miller and Luft in 1994 and 1997
cover studies whose data were actually collected prior to 1992.319 At that
time, physician practices only had to cut the "fat" and not the "lean."3 20 In
addition, the HMOs of the 1980s were very different from those of today. In
1985, for example, only 26% of HMO members were in for-profit plans; by
315. Id. ("The check on this influence... is the professional obligation to provide covered
services with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interests.").
316. See, e.g., David U. Himmeistein et al., Quality of Care in Investor-Oumed vs. Notfor-Profit
HMOs, 282 JAMA 159, 159-61 (1999) (reviewing the data); Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft,
Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7, 10
(same).
317. See, e.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 316, at 159 (reviewing the literature); Miller
and Luft, supra note 316, at 14 (same); John E. Ware Jr., et al., Differences in 4-Year Health
Outcomes for Elderly and Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Sevice Systems, 276
JAMA 1039, 103942 (1996).
318. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 166 (1995) ("The studies also are not rigorous enough to exclude the
possibility of undetected harmful consequences.").
319. See generally Miller & Luft, supra note 316. A smaller study using 1993-95 data also
found that outcomes differed little. See David M. Cutler et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31
RANDJ. ECON. 526,533-35,541 (2000).
320. See Orentlicher, supra note 318, at 166.
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1998, that proportion had increased to 62%.32' A major 1999 study by
Himmelstein and colleagues found that for-profit HMOs had uniformly
worse quality of care than not-for-profit HMOs. The outcomes were worse
both for preventive measures, like breast cancer screening and
immunizations, and for therapeutic measures, such as the use of beta-
blockers for patients discharged after a myocardial infarction.
323
Surprisingly, in both types of plans, overall expenses were the same.
However, the not-for-profit plans spent a greater percentage of their
premium dollars on patient care and less on profit and overhead. 324 These
results are consistent with other studies exploring the relationship between
325HMO ownership and quality of care.
The early HMOs also used staff and group models that have now been
replaced by network and independent practice association (IPA) models. 326
Here, too, the change is material. The 1999 Himmelstein study found that
staff and group models had higher scores on nearly all quality-of-care
indicators than network and IPA models.
327
Furthermore, early HMOs paid their physicians a salary; today, most
managed care plans use reimbursement schemes that provide a greater
incentive for economy, such as capitation and bonuses for reduced
328
utilization. Once again, this change may be significant; methods of
reimbursement do affect physician behavior.3
321. Himmerstein et al., supra note 316, at 159. Between 1988 and 1994, for-profit HMO
membership expanded by 91.6% while not-for-profits expanded by only 24.8%. See Gabel, supra
note 257, at 135.
322. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 316, at 159 (concluding that "[investor-owned
HMOs deliver lower quality of care than not-for-profit plans"). The inferiority of investor-owned
HMOs extended across all fourteen quality of care criteria used in the study. Similarly, an
earlier study found that for-profit HMOs had a significantly lower rate of hospitalization than
not-for-profit plans. See Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians'
Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 86, 88 (1989).
323. Himmerstein et al., supra note 316 at 162. The authors concluded that many patients
in for-profit HMOs "may die needlessly." Id.
324. See id. at 162 (finding that spending on profit and overhead was 48% higher in
investor-owned plans).
325. Id. (reviewing the literature).
326. See id. at 159 (noting the shift away from group- and staff-model plans).
327. Id. at 161-62 and tbl.3.
328. See Emanuel & Goldman, supra note 304, at 636-37 (stating that over 60% of managed
care plans withhold a portion of payment to cover expenditures that exceed target projections
for specialists or hospitals); Gabel, supra note 257, at 140 tbl.5 (noting that between 1989 and
1994, the percentage of HMO primary care physicians paid by capitation had increased from
35% to 50%); Himmelstein et al., supra note 316, at 159 (noting the shift away from group- and
staff-model plans).
329. See Hillman et al., supra note 322, at 88 (finding that capitation was associated with a
lower rate of hospitalization); Himmelstein et al., supra note 316, at 159 (noting the shift away
from group- and staff-model plans and their impact on patient care). But see Douglas A. Conrad
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Even nonprofit HMOs behave differently today than they did a decade
ago. Today, they are more likely to reimburse their physicians in ways that
encourage reduced utilization, to have abandoned community rating, and to
have copied for-profit plans in other ways. 33 0 Finally, recent reports suggest
that managed care has a spill-over effect. Doctors who frequently treat HMO
patients tend to treat their non-HMO patients in the same cost-conscious
way.331 Because managed care norms are spilling over into fee-for-service
practices, studies comparing managed care outcomes with nonmanaged care
outcomes may miss the true impact of managed care on absolute health care
quality. Because of the spill-over effect, managed care's concern with
profitability could be producing outcomes throughout the health care
industry that fall short of those which are reasonably attainable. As a
consequence, it is impossible not to worry when reading reports that heart
and asthma patients do better when seen by specialists than by primary care
physicians,3 2 that an increasing number of newborns are developing
jaundice-related brain damage caused in part by premature hospital
discharge after birth, 3 3 and that AIDS patients die earlier in managed
334
care.
Three conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, there is no evidence
that overall health care quality has declined due to the growth of managed
care. Second, the welfare of certain vulnerable subgroups has suffered from
managed care. Finally, substantial uncertainty remains about the impact that
recent changes in managed care systems have had on quality of care. These
uncertainties justify continued judicial scrutiny. The jury-set reasonable
physician standard provides this scrutiny.
et al., Primary Care Physician Compensation Method in Medical Groups: Does it Influence the Use and
Cost of Health Services for Enrollees in Managed Care Organizations?, 279 JAMA 853, 853 (1998)
(abstract) (studying payment within medical groups, rather than by health plans, and finding
no statistically significant relationship between compensation and utilization).
330. SeeHimmelstein et al., supra note 316, at 163 (reporting these behaviors).
331. See Study: HMOs Influence Care of Doctors'Non-HMO Patients, COLUM. DAILYTRIB., Feb. 4,
1999, at 8 (describing a study by Laurence Baker); Sherry Glied &Joshua Zivin, How Do Doctors
Behave When Some (But Not All) of Their Patients are in Managed Care?, available at
http://papers.ssrm.com/paper.tafiabstract._id=242141 (finding that treatment differences
become attenuated when a physician's HMO practice share rises). Commentators attribute this
carry-over to convenience or endorsement of HMO norms, but cognitive dissonance seems an
equally plausible explanation. For doctors to treat their non-HMO patients more aggressively
than their HMO patients would be to admit to themselves that they are giving their HMO
patients inappropriate care.
332. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIALTY CARE: HEART ATrACK SuRvivoRs TREATED BY
CARDIOLOGISTS MORE LIKELYTO TAKE REcOMMENDED DRUGS 1 (1998).
333. See Experts Blame Short Hospital Stays for Untreated Jaundice in Newborns, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, May 3, 2001, atA7.
334. See Aids Patients May Die Earlier in Managed Care, INTERNAL MED. NEwS, Nov. 1, 1996, at
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G. ENCOURAGING FULL DISCLOSURE
The reasonable physician standard also gives the health care industry a
much-needed incentive to engage the community in a dialogue about health
care resources.3 15 If the industry desires to lower the standard of care below
the levels that juries demand, then the industry will need either to convince
the public that frugality is socially responsible or else obtain the ex ante
agreement of subscribers to a modification of the standard of care. In short,
they will need to disclose their intention of providing more economical care
and obtain either community or subscriber assent.
At present, however, neither physicians nor managed care plans
336
currently disclose their cost-control philosophies or strategies. In fact, they
fight vigorously and effectively against legislation or judicial rulings that
would mandate greater disclosure of their cost consciousness or of the
337financial incentives given to physicians to reduce utilization. The result is a
health plan utopia. Plans encourage cost-control at the bedside without
disclosing this to patients. Furthermore, the bedside rationing that results is
largely hidden from patients, unlike prospective utilization review.
Yet, it is disingenuous to hide important information from subscribers
because they are likely to revolt against it and then to criticize jurors for
having the same reaction that subscribers would have experienced. Critics
often fear that the public wants a Cadillac for the price of a Chevy. However,
health plans contribute to that mentality by promising equal quality at a
335. In this respect, the reasonable physician standard constitutes an information-forcing
default rule. To the extent that courts allow contractual modification of this standard of care,
the rule is also information-forcing in a second respect. By obliging nonconforming plans and
providers to rely on contract, the reasonable physician standard of care forces these providers
to disclose their cost-containment philosophies and strategies to their patients and subscribers
and to obtain bilateral agreement. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theoy of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (suggesting that "penalty
default" rules should sometimes be chosen to "give at least one party to the contract an
incentive ... to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer"); cf James Lindgren,
Death by Default, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 218-19 (1993) (applying the Ayres and Gertner
proposal to the patient-physician relationship in the context of advance directives). Ayres and
Gertner called these rules "penalty" defaults because the law intentionally selects a rule that the
informed party would not prefer in order to induce that party to disclose and negotiate its
preferred rule. In situations where repeat players are likely to have knowledge of both the
default rule and the contingencies that might arise, the repeat players should be given an
incentive to share this information with the other contracting parties. Ayers & Gertner, supra,
at 98-99.
336. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 213, at 225 (noting that disclosure today is not adequate);
Himmelstein, supra note 316, at 163 (noting that fewer HMOs are submitting data to the NCQA
data bank used in the Himmelstein study); Spragins, supra note 270, at 74 (noting that
declining numbers of health plans are disclosing quality data).
337. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that an ERISA health plan had no fiduciary duty to disclose physician compensation
arrangements that included incentives to keep utilization to a minimum).
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lower price. Until plans and physicians are more honest and do their part
to create a public consensus in favor of reasonable cost controls, they are
poorly positioned to complain that juries are offended by cost-based
treatment decisions.
The reasonable physician standard will give health plans an incentive to
begin that conversation. The custom-based standard of care provides no
similar incentive toward openness. Instead, the custom-based standard
allows health care professionals to decide unilaterally what is good for the
community. Under that regime, managed care organizations can pay
physicians to lower the standard of care through hidden rationing decisions
that, once customary, are immune from judicial scrutiny. Remarkably, this
can be accomplished without ever disclosing that the standard of care is
changing. This is a serious shortcoming of the custom-based standard of
care.
H. SUMMARY OFPOTET'IALADVANTAGES
Abandonment of the custom-based standard of care in favor of a
reasonable physician standard offers several potential advantages. Most
importantly, the reasonable physician standard assigns the task of legal
standard-setting to representatives of the community, rather than to the
regulated industry. Jury decision-making is more likely to incorporate
community values. Moreover, the flexibility of the reasonable physician
standard provides more protection for innovators and less shelter for those
adhering to antiquated customs. Furthermore, the reasonable physician
standard is a more honest way to accomplish these goals than bending the
custom-based standard to cure its shortcomings. The reasonable physician
standard of care also gives the health care industry an incentive to engage
the community in a dialogue about health care resources. At the same time,
it allows the courts to supervise the influence of the managed care industry
on clinical practices.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts are gradually abandoning the custom-based standard of
care. The policy implications of this ongoing shift are fundamental. The
underlying issue is whether malpractice law will continue to be a unique
338. Explains George Anders:
HMOs don't present themselves as the medical equivalent of a tawdry motel chain
or a discount clothing store in a rundown part of town, blithely selling an inferior
product in the name of having the cheapest possible price. Managed-care
companies promise to uphold standards through their cost cutting, simply by
targeting wasteful practices.
GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST 59
(1996), excerpted inCURRANETAL, supra note 41, at 392-93.
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corner of tort law in which a respected industry sets its own standard of care
or whether the standard will be set by members of the jury as it is in other
tort actions. On the one hand, abandonment of a custom-based standard of
care arguably demands more of lay jurors than we can reasonably expect of
them. On the other hand, the delegation of standard-setting to the jury will
give courts an improved ability to police the practices of physicians facing
pressures to cut costs.
Tort law originally delegated the standard-setting power to physicians
because of their expertise and their trustworthiness. During the ensuing
century, both the health care delivery system and our understanding of it
have changed enormously. We now know that many common practices have
no scientific basis. Customs vary inexplicably from one town to another.
Modem medicine is also rife with conflicts that influence clinical decision-
making. Most importantly, physicians are losing their control over the health
care industry to for-profit insurers, an industry that has not yet earned the
right of self-regulation.
In theory, market forces might be expected to insure that medical
customs accurately reflect consumer preferences. In practice, however,
market imperfections in the health care sector are simply too pervasive to
insure that health care practices reflect community wishes. Furthermore,
there is often no governing custom at all, leaving the courts without
guidance.
For all of these reasons, a custom-based standard of care has serious
shortcomings. Are juries likely to perform any better? The empirical data on
jury performance is largely reassuring. Judges and juries usually agree, even
on complex cases. Moreover, jurors are even more skeptical of malpractice
claims than are physician reviewers. However, the jury's capacity to
understand statistical proof, its resistance to hindsight bias, and its
willingness to take costs into account have yet to be confirmed.
The choice, therefore, is between two standards of care that are likely to
be imperfect in operation. If the choice between the two standards had to be
made exclusively on this basis, the choice would be difficult and highly
speculative. However, there are important reasons for preferring the
reasonable physician standard of care. First, the reasonable care standard is
more honest. Second, it is more hospitable to innovation. Third, it
empowers the jury, rather than the industry, to set the standard of care. This
assignment of responsibility ensures that the increasingly commercialized
health care delivery system is accountable to community values. As long as
managed care entities are permitted to reward physicians for cutting back
on referrals to specialists, hospitalizations, and diagnostic testing,
community supervision of medical practices is warranted.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the reasonable physician
standard gives the health care industry an incentive to engage the
community in a dialogue about health care resources. If the industry desires
[20021
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to lower the standard of care below the levels juries demand, then the
industry will need either to convince the public that frugality is socially
responsible or to obtain the agreement of subscribers ex ante to a
modification of the standard of care. The custom-based standard of care
provides no similar incentive toward openness. Instead, the custom-based
standard allows health care professionals to decide unilaterally what is good
for the community. This is surely a serious shortcoming of the custom-based
standard of care.
The crucial unanswered question, of course, is whether the law can
delegate the standard of care to the jury without undermining socially
responsible cost containment. Until better research is done, courts and
scholars will have to speculate about the answer to this question. However,
even the simplest tort action has social resource implications. Juries resolve
these cases admirably. In addition, no crises have arisen in states rejecting
the custom-based standard of care. Until more is known about jury
reactions, it seems inappropriate to solve a problem that may not exist by
continuing to confer on health care providers a privilege of self-regulation
not afforded to other tort defendants.3 9
339. States that wish to move more cautiously could also experiment with compromises. For
example, courts could announce their use of the reasonable physician test only when no
established custom applies. In practice, that is already how many customary care states appear
to treat malpractice cases.
Different alternatives have been proposed by Keeton, King and Bloche. King
recommended that physicians have a duty to comply with "accepted" standards. See King, supra
note 62, at 1236-44. This appears to mean that plaintiffs should be able to challenge a
defendant's compliance with customary practices if, but only if, the plaintiff can produce
evidence of clinical trials showing that the custom is no longer good medicine. However, this
approach would insulate customary practices that themselves have no scientific basis and it
provides no role for cost-consciousness.
Keeton suggested immunizing physician conduct only when a physician complied with
a formally adopted professional guideline. See Keeton, supra note 53, at 368.Juries probably will
reach the same result under the reasonable physician standard whenever the adopting
professional body is credible. In practice, however, the credibility of professional guidelines
varies widely and their guidelines sometimes conflict.
More recently, a preliminary draft by Gregg BIoche has suggested that defendants who
withhold marginally beneficial care be liable, at least when the care is potentially life-saving,
unless they can offer proof of cost-ineffectiveness. See Bloche, supra note 249, at 69-70. In
essence, this proposal rejects the custom-based standard of care and then puts the burden of
proving reasonability on the defendant. As such, it is even more protective of patient access to
care than the reasonable physician test.
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